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 1.Introduction 
 
  The influence of culture- and in particular cultural values- is an active and promising area of 
research within economics, resulting in a variety of field and experimental studies in the 
literature (See de Jong (2009) for an overview).  It is becoming increasingly obvious that 
values have a huge impact on economic and other behaviour. Different values within a 
society can lead to political disagreements and clashes, different business values lead to 
different employment practices, different consumer values lead to different goods being 
bought and different values between societies can have a serious effect on the ability to trade 
and invest in different countries. 
However, the theoretical literature has lagged behind with few papers actively trying 
to model values as distinct from norms and conventions. Within cultural economics, values 
are generally instrumentalised from questionnaires that are in widespread use in anthropology 
and sociology (See de Jong (2009) and Inglehart et al. (1998) for examples) and have little 
theoretical foundation.  This is a shame in that a reasonable theory of values would help to 
explain some of the culture clashes that do occur and allow us to predict which situations are 
likely to occur. Furthermore, the papers that do exist do not seem to fit the notion of values 
very well in that they ignore certain common characteristics that should be explained by any 
reasonable theory. It will be argued that to explain these characteristics requires us to take 
seriously concepts that are widely used in cognitive disciplines but are not widely used in 
economics. 
In order to demonstrate the applicability of these ideas we will construct a model of 
values that casts some light on the issue of multiculturalism and the issues brought up by 
multiculturalism. Values (together with cultural objects, icons etc.) constitute a culture (see 
Sperber 1996). This means that a theoretical study of values may have something to tell us 
about how likely particular cultures are to survive in competition with each other. Is a 
multicultural society likely to survive or are some cultures going to be assimilated by others? 
How crucial are institutions within society in the preservation of multiculturalism? The 
simple model presented here will give some preliminary answers to these questions. 
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 2.Other Theories of Value 
 
Values are quite often ignored in economics even when they are the ostensible subject 
of discussion. An example of this is in the book “Economics, Values and Organization” 
(1998) edited by Ben-ner and Putterman. In this book are papers by a wide variety of 
academics from various disciplines. What is interesting is that among the economists (e.g. 
Robert Sugden, Ken Binmore, Timur Kuran) values, as such, are only mentioned in passing 
or they are conflated with other moral concepts such as norms. An example is in Sugden’s 
paper: in spite of a long discussion (p.74-77) on the importance of values, Sugden ultimately 
identifies values with conventions and normative expectations. However it is not clear, as I 
will discuss below, that values on one hand and norms and conventions on the other are in 
any way the same thing. 
Two attempts that have been made to theorise values have been by Tabellini (2008) 
and Bisin and Verdier (2001). In both papers it is assumed that altruistic traits are passed 
down through a process of “imperfect empathy” from one’s parents. Parents are “imperfectly 
altruistic” in that they judge the best interests of their children using their own, rather than 
their children’s, utility functions. Parents then expend effort in trying to socialise their 
children with these cultural traits through an expenditure of effort. Children sometimes pick 
up these traits but at other times pick up a trait from the population as a whole. Children only 
definitively pick up a trait when their parents and the population as a whole share the same 
preferences. Tabellini extends this model to account for the fact that some individuals may be 
more socially or physically distant than others. 
As it stands, this analysis is attractive in that it describes much about the transmission 
of cultural traits within a population. In particular, it neatly describes the problems of parents 
trying to instil particular values in an environment that may be hostile to such values and also 
the idea that one tends to value people further away less than those close to. However, there 
is little in either paper to explain how values emerge within a population. Why should one set 
of values be seen as something valuable that should be passed on from one generation to 
another? In other words these papers, while insightful, say little about how values emerge or 
come to be held extensively within a population in the first place. 
 A deeper problem with these papers is that it is not clear what a value actually is. It is 
described as a trait that is inherited to a greater or lesser extent from parents (or role models) 
to children which in turn gives utility to the parents. However, it is unclear why these traits 
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are valuable to parents or why they think that these traits are valuable to their children. Traits 
are merely things that are transmitted with greater or lesser effect from one generation to 
another. They are obviously preferred in some sense to other possible traits. However these 
traits do not seem to be preferences in themselves. Furthermore, it is assumed that self -
interest is separate from values but this is not obviously true- some values may be based on 
self-interested motivations (one may value being in a trade union because of the benefits it  
brings to oneself.) 
Furthermore, socialisation is something that is very loosely defined. It is obvious that 
parents would need to make a value judgement in order to socialise their children. It is also an 
implication of these models that the children take on these values in opposition to their own 
preferences, which implies that socialisation is to some extent coercive. However, this does 
not seem to be the case in many circumstances where socialisation, whether from parents or 
wider society, seems to be voluntary. It seems that people are quite willing to become 
socialised into another culture and “fit in” with the local population. However, the details of 
this are left vague by the extant models and need to be examined in more detail. 
 
3.Multiculturalism  
In this paper the model that will be put forward will be used to give a preliminary, 
simple analysis of multiculturalism. There are many different views of multiculturalism so 
from the point of view of this paper we will focus on the ideas put forward by one author. 
The author selected is Parekh (2006) who emphasises the role of culture as a system of 
beliefs and practices where values play a central role. Everyone in Parekh’s view belongs to a 
cultural community which shares both practices and beliefs. Society and culture are to be 
distinguished from each other since society consists of a group of humans and the relations 
between them while culture provides the “software”- the content and principles underlying 
those relations. 
 Culture, to a large extent, shapes and influences individuals. In particular, the shared 
beliefs of people within the cultural community mean that people are more likely to follow a 
given practice. However, culture is malleable so that people within a culture are free to leave 
the culture (albeit retaining some vestiges of it even after having rejected it.). Cultures, and 
the individuals within those cultures, are able to take on ideas and values from other cultures. 
Diversity is inevitable (and, according to Parekh, desirable) within societies and it is quite 
possible to have cultures living side by side with each other within a society. Even within an 
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initially homogenous society, the diverse capacities of humans within the society mean that 
there will develop considerable divergences from the cultural community’s “norm”. 
  This view of multiculturalism has become quite influential within cultural studies so 
it is worth asking whether the implicit claims made hold up to scrutiny. Is it indeed possible 
for cultures to survive in a stable state next to each other in a society? If humans are indeed 
free to look at and take on board values from other cultural communities will this lead to the 
cultures surviving or will one set of values simply collapse? Do divergences from cultural 
norms necessarily remain or will there be a tendency for these divergences to vanish (or even 
take over the entire cultural community?). 
 
4.Grounding for a theory of values 
 
The aim of this paper is to present a theory of values that explains the formation and 
distribution of values within a society. As such, the model is an attempt to formulate how 
values may form in a “state of nature” without any institutions1 and with a population that is 
free to learn from all other members of the population. It also excludes any influence from 
education or from parental guidance. This means that members of the population formulate 
their ideas about values and their actions given these values without any indoctrination or 
coercive socialisation2 of values. 
 By its very nature, these restrictions exclude a large proportion of methods by which 
people do come to hold their values. As a matter of fact, most people probably do get their 
values from one of the sources mentioned above. One example is in education. Many people 
are taught fundamental values while being educated (objectivity in scientific research for 
example). These values do not necessarily arise from interactions between individuals in a 
population. Indeed, the values may be formulated by a comparatively small group of people 
(say, scientists and philosophers throughout history) while the education system is used to 
spread these values to the wider population.  
 The model also ignores the effect of role models in a society. Fashion, for example, is 
an example of a set of values that tends to be set by a comparatively small group of people 
(actors, models, socialites, pop stars) and is spread through the wider population by the mass 
media. In medieval times local holy men may have played the same role for religious people. 
1 See Denzau and North (1994) for an example of a theory where institutions do influence values. 
2 It will be argued later that “non-coercive” socialisation is little different from ordinary learning 
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Role models have many more links to other people when it comes to persuading people to 
change their mind about values. It is assumed in our model that such people do not exist. 
The model, therefore, is narrowly defined. However, its aim is to abstract away from 
the complications outlined above and find out how values can be defined and modelled in a 
simple model. Once it is seen that values can be modelled with clarity and precision then it 
will be easier to incorporate the complications.  
I will assume throughout this paper that humans are capable of non- self- interested 
behaviour and motivations. The paper will take no position on how humans arrive in this 
position in evolutionary terms. It will be assumed that non- self- interested behaviour has 
minimal implications for the fitness3 of the individual involved and so fitness will not enter 
into the utility functions of the individuals making altruistic choices. Individuals will take 
notice of payoffs involved insofar as these impact on utility but the impact may not be self-
interested. One may donate to charity, for example, and gain greater utility from donating 
more money. 
 
5.Values as Preferences 
 
First, it is necessary to define values. One definition is by Rokeach (1973):  
“To say that a person ‘has a value’ is to say that he has an enduring belief that a 
specific mode of conduct or end-of-state existence is personally and socially preferable to 
alternative modes of conduct or end-states of existence” 
It can be seen that this definition is very broad. Indeed one might sensibly ask what 
the difference is between values on one hand and preferences as defined by economists on the 
other. It will be argued in this paper that there is no real difference: values are simply a type 
of preference (although there are preferences, a sudden craving for ice-cream for example, 
that are not values). 
 One crucial distinction between values and other types of preference are their 
comparable longevity. One can say that someone has a value when they hold a definite 
preference for something for a long time. It would be peculiar to say, for example, that one 
valued one’s wristwatch if one thinks that one will keep it now but was thinking about 
throwing it away five minutes ago.  
3 Indeed it is hard to see why fitness is emphasised by so many game theorists when discussing humans. One 
can carry out many altruistic actions without this in any way reducing one’s ability to reproduce. A quick 
examination of demography shows that there is no positive correlation between reproductive success and 
wealth. 
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One can also say that values are consciously and intentionally held. They are not the 
result of accidental selection or unconscious urgings. They may be held as habits without 
being deliberately chosen every time they are invoked but this does not mean that they are 
unexamined. Even habits usually start out as conscious decisions and are usually the result of 
intentional behaviour. 
A crucial aspect of values (contrary to Sugden’s claim mentioned above) is that they 
are distinct from norms and conventions. A convention is a mode of action that is repeated 
over a long period of time as the result of an implicit agreement between the parties carrying 
out the action. This is usually modelled in evolutionary game theory as a particular Nash 
equilibrium in a game with multiple equilibria. If the population converges on one of the 
equilibria then that equilibrium becomes the convention. A norm is a convention that evolved 
previously which is upheld even when there is no history of interaction between the agents 
who are currently interacting. One uses a normative action because one has legitimate 
expectations (Sugden 2005) that the other person will also use that norm. 
However, a critical aspect of values is that they may hold even if there is no action 
played corresponding to that value. To take an example: one may hold that stealing kestrel 
eggs from nests is wrong without ever seeing a kestrel egg that was in a position to be stolen. 
Likewise, one may value patriotism in wartime without ever having to fight a war. In both 
cases there is no underlying convention that forces one to follow the moral rule. Instead, one 
follows the rules because of one’s underlying values. 
It follows from this that values cannot necessarily be accessed by revealed preference. 
Revealed preference would reveal the existence of conventions and norms but would not say 
anything about values that are not exemplified by actions. This is reflected in the practical 
sphere by the use of questionnaires to elicit values rather than revealed preference techniques 
(c.f. Inglehart et al. 1998). 
 Values, as defined Rokeach, can cover both individual and group values. While 
individual values are important to the person concerned, economics is more concerned with 
the actions of large groups of people rather than the idiosyncrasies of individuals or small 
groups. As such, this paper will focus on the behaviour of values held by large groups of 
people rather than individuals. 
Another important point is that values seem to be context sensitive (Seligman & Katz 
1996). Different values seem to be invoked in different circumstances. When different issues 
are at stake, different values are invoked to argue them out. A ready wit, for example, is more 
valued at a dinner party rather than at a funeral wake. This has interesting implications: 
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values are not as universally or consistently applied as one might think and one might apply 
values differently in different circumstances. It follows that any theory of values must take 
account of this context sensitivity. 
Another point that has to be made about values is that they seem to vary consistently 
between groups. These may vary between groups in a society (e.g. different food restrictions 
in the Sikh and Muslim religions in India) or between societies (Inglehart 1998). The latter is 
particularly important in cultural economics where these differences between countries drive 
many of the differences in economic variables that have been found in the literature (de Jong 
2009). These differences in values have been tested experimentally (see Henrich et al. 2004) 
and there are distinct differences in reactions between different groups. 
 The experiments by Henrich et al also demonstrate that any model of values must 
allow for the fact that different groups may end up with different values in the same situation. 
It would be unreasonable to postulate, for example, that there is a “long-run equilibrium” set 
of values to which all people in a given situation will converge. Furthermore, one has to 
account for the fact that when different groups undertake different actions they seem to give 
different reasons for these actions as well. It is not just that people converge to different 
equilibria within the same framework. Often their mental frameworks seem to differ as well. 
 
6. Fundamental ideas for a theory of values 
Discussion of values is widespread across a variety of disciplines. In this section we 
will discuss the ideas of two writers- one a philosopher, Joseph Raz (2003), and the other an 
anthropologist, Dan Sperber (1996). These two writers have similar views on many aspects of 
values and have tried to accommodate many of the points outlined above, albeit from 
differing perspectives. 
 Raz approaches the problem of values from a philosophical perspective. His 
aim is to try to provide a view of values that allows for value pluralism without degenerating 
into relativism. In his view, values initially emerge through the use of supporting practices. 
As people carry out these practices then values are created by the participants in these 
practices to regulate and excel in them. An example of this is opera which is a practice that 
has a variety of values (good operatic singing, intelligent interpretation of the music) that 
could only exist together within opera. 
 These values, once they are established through the practice, have an independent 
existence of their own. They can survive even if the original supporting practice dies out. 
These values tend to be highly specific in that they only apply in the tightly defined areas 
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where they emerge. However, once they emerge then they can be used anywhere within this 
area without needing a supporting practice. More general values emerge as generalisations of 
more specific values and do not have their own sustaining practices. 
 It should be pointed out that Raz is not claiming that sustaining practices “create” 
values- valuation is a human activity that can only be done by human beings. Humans value 
things but which things are to be valued is dependent on the social practices in existence. Raz 
therefore is not claiming that valuation has any objective basis but merely that the occurrence 
of values is based on contingent practices. 
Sperber (1996) approaches culture from an anthropological point of view. In his view 
the basic building block of culture (which includes values) is the representation. The term 
“representation” has a wide range of meanings but for, the purposes of this paper, the type of 
representation we (and Sperber) are interested in is the mental representation4. A mental 
representation is an interpretation of the world held internally by an information processing 
device (such as humans!). This is a cognitive picture of how the human mind works- relating 
the mind to information- processing by a computer. 
 This notion of the mind as being modelled as a computer has its origins in the work 
of Simon (Simon 1959). Under Simon’s ideas, humans are seen as boundedly rational 
computing machines who construct “specifications” (Simon & March p. 172) of the 
situations in which they operate. These “specifications”, which can be seen to be equivalent 
to the “representations” used by Sperber and others, consist of knowledge of future events, 
knowledge of alternatives available for action, knowledge of consequences attached to 
alternatives and rules or preferences for ordering consequences. This defines a situation for a 
particular actor but does not give an objective assessment. Indeed, this assessment is usually a 
screened, simplified and biased view of the situation. Knowledge of the future for example is 
quite often simply unknown and is usually dealt with by using previously used ideas. 
This idea of representations is used widely within Social Psychology. According to 
Ross and Nisbett (1991 –see also Bowles & Gintis 2011 p.43) situational variables have a 
substantial effect on human decision making and quite often make more of a contribution 
towards decision making than the character and stable preferences of the decision maker. 
Furthermore the representations of situations are construed by the decision maker and so are 
essentially subjective rather than objective. They can vary from person to person and can 
vary within a person from one time to another. Indeed, it has been argued by Sen (1980) that 
4 A similar notion of representations as the grounding for values is put forward by Mandler (1993- see also Ross 
and Nisbett 1991), although he tends to refer to a particular type of representation known as a schema. 
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description of any kind is inevitably selective and partial so insofar as a representation is an 
individual’s description of the external world, it will suffer from the same flaws for the same 
reasons. 
   The lack of knowledge of the situation and the arbitrariness involved is particularly 
marked when it comes to values because of the lack of any objective link between values and 
a particular objective situation (See Bowles & Gintis 2011 p. 44 for a similar claim). As Raz 
points out, valuation is essentially a human activity and any attempt to derive values from 
objective reality is probably futile. It follows that any representation of a situation when a 
person is valuing that situation will not have totally objective foundations. No situation will 
logically suggest any particular set of values independently of human valuation. 
Representations therefore have an inescapably subjective element when referring to values. 
Mental representations, according to Sperber, are used by the information processing 
devices (i.e. minds) to affect other people by interfacing with the physical environment. This 
can be by direct or indirect communication and this in turn causes other people to create 
mental representations in their own minds. As a result of this, mental representations are 
transmitted from one person to another. Sperber then defines a cultural or social 
representation as a representation that is commonly held among the general population. He 
sees the aim of anthropology as being to investigate the “epidemiology” of these cultural 
representations. 
 One question that Sperber attempts to answer is which sort of mental representation 
will succeed in becoming a social representation? This is a wide ranging problem but some 
relevant attributes are: 
i) Ease of memorisation 
ii) Existence of relevant background knowledge. 
iii) A motive for communicating the content of the representation 
iv) Recurrence of the situation which the representation gives rise to. 
v) Availability of external memory stores (writing, mobile phones) 
vi) Existence of institutions engaged in transmission of institution. 
This will tend to cut down the number of mental representations that can ever become 
social representations. One side effect of this is that many representations that are deemed to 
be important in society- knowledge of the law or of science for example, rarely become 
common knowledge among the mass of the population because of their complexity, lack of 
knowledge etc. 
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7. Interpretation and variation of representations   
 
Both Sperber and Raz emphasise the fact that one’s knowledge about values is not 
fixed. According to Raz, one’s knowledge about values is limited and it is quite possible that 
in the same situation, two people may quite reasonably disagree. Raz locates this 
disagreement in the human capacity for judgement and understanding. Given limited 
information, people will use their judgement to interpret a situation and come to a conclusion. 
These judgements may be starkly different and this leaves scope for considerable 
disagreement between people5. 
Sperber also emphasises the role of interpretation, although his ideas are somewhat 
more radical than those of Raz. In his view, there are two points of interpretation. The first 
point is when representations are first conceived. This leads to various distinct interpretations 
of a situation. The second point when interpretation happens is every time a mental 
representation passes from one person to another. Communication therefore is as much about 
transformation as it is about transmission. It should be noted that Sperber does not claim that 
transformation results in the emergence of something completely different. Indeed, some 
resemblance to the previous representation remains. 
Sperber creates a model of cultural attraction in which descendants of a particular 
mental representation, when communicated, always differ from their parents. However, this 
variation is not simply random. Certain versions of mental representations are more 
“attractive” than other mental representations. As a result of this, representations will not 
transform at random but will tend to converge on these representational attractors. 
 There are various factors which make a particular version of a mental representation 
more attractive than others. Sperber theorises that the crucial factor in human cognitive 
processing is the maximisation of relevance i.e. having a maximum effect for minimum 
effort. Some things that are perceived as relevant are highly idiosyncratic and only apply to a 
few people. However, some are generally held by large numbers of people. These must be 
easy to remember and to understand. There must also be enough incentives to recall the 
representation and transmit it. Also it must be credible- it must be believed by the people who 
transmit it and it must also make sense. It would be expected therefore that any representation 
must contain beliefs that are easily understood, that make sense or are worth having.  
5 Ross and Nisbett (1991) come to a similar conclusion from a social psychological perspective based on the 
work of Asche (1940) 
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Sperber argued his case for representation in opposition to the common idea that 
cultural progress is carried out by evolutionary style selection arguments (c.f. Cavalli-Sforza 
& Feldman 1981, also   Dawkins 1976). However, it has been argued by Henrich and Boyd 
(2002) that this contrast is a false one. In a series of three models, they demonstrate that the 
variation in representations caused by such strong attractors can be modelled with selection 
processes and ultimately, even if the selection process is comparatively weak, it will come to 
dominate the overall evolutionary process. 
It can be said therefore that representations are essentially subjective entities that can 
vary considerably from person to person. However, while some of these representations may 
“mutate” as they spread through the population, these mutations are rarely stable and there is 
a tendency for them to converge on a prototype. These mutations can be modelled as a 
random process of deviations from a mean where the latter corresponds to Sperber’s attractor 
representation. 
 
8.Values and Emotions 
 A crucial assumption made in this paper is that self-interest is not the only motivating 
force for human beings (while still being a motivating force). This should not be a 
controversial assumption as a multitude of economics and psychological experiments have 
shown that, even in economically important decisions, self-interest is not always the deciding 
factor (c.f. Bowles and Gintis 2011, Fehr 1999).  As has been pointed out by Mansbridge 
(1998), it is impossible to seriously base morals on self-interest since it goes against the 
innate emotions and cognitive capacities of human beings. 
   Another problem with the self-interested view is that one can make an argument for 
self-interest being a type of value. A cynic might argue that free-market ideologues do this all 
the time but there are a vast number of situations where being able to follow your own self-
interest is generally valuable. Simply choosing which apple a person would like to eat is a 
privilege that most people enjoy and find valuable yet it is fundamentally self-interested. 
Self-interest therefore is not really a special state apart but rather an alternative set of values 
that a person may select from those that are available.   
Mandler (1993) emphasises the crucial role played by values in the inducing of 
emotions. Mandler points out that, however visceral and “hot” an emotion may be, all 
emotions must rely on some cognitive processing so that a person may establish and interpret 
a situation. A person usually only gets angry at having their wallet stolen if they have, indeed, 
had their wallet stolen. A person who gets angry at having their wallet stolen when this is not 
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the case is seen as having no justification for their anger. To get angry therefore requires 
cognitive processing to establish that the wallet has indeed been stolen. 
 Many, but not all, emotions tend to be aroused by an expectation generated by a 
mental representation. This of course does not apply to all emotions. Many emotions are 
instinctual and automatic so that there is little beyond identifying the situation that the mind 
does in sparking the emotion. If an iron rod is being dropped from the roof of a building then, 
once this has been identified, the body tries to avoid it, automatically invoking a feeling of 
fear. However, many such emotions are learned and are acquired over time and it is these 
emotions that often emerge from following, or failing to follow, values. People, therefore, 
will identify the situation and also the value that needs to be followed before emotion 
emerges in response.  Given that values are assumed to be preferences expressed within a 
certain representation, it follows that many people will feel emotional if values are being 
violated or even if values are being followed.  
  Many emotions therefore have their foundations in values or in the violation of 
perceived values. Frank (1988) has observed that emotions can override self-interest and that 
this enables people to make commitments which solve problems that cannot otherwise be 
solved6. However, the ability to make commitments means that it must be possible to reliably 
communicate one’s emotions. Frank claims that this is achieved either through a person 
building a reputation for honestly having these emotions or by outward signs of this emotion 
that are very hard to fake7. 
   It should be noticed that Frank is not claiming that these emotions are on public 
view or that they cannot be faked. However, Frank points out that that, like all signalling 
devices, emotions are quite hard to fake and also that, for emotions to work as a commitment 
device, most emotions must be genuine. While it may be difficult to find out another’s true 
emotions, it is rarely impossible and fakery is often unsuccessful. Indeed, people who tend to 
be successful at faking their emotions (such as psychopaths) tend to be ostracised within 
society and quite often end up worse off. Indeed, from an evolutionary point of view, it is 
difficult to see exactly why emotions would survive if they were easily faked. Their role as a 
signal would be undermined by rampant fraud, while being psychologically costly to those 
experiencing the emotions. 
6 An example of this would be the emotion of love in marriage which would prevent a person from bailing out at 
the earliest possible favourable opportunity. A person who can show that they love another person would be 
seen as a better marriage partner because they are in the marriage for the long term and so they can invest more 
in the marriage. 
7 See Scharlemann, Eckel et al. (2001) for an economic experiment that demonstrates that participants react 
positively to photographs of their opponents smiling in a trust game. 
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It follows that we have a linkage between values and emotion with the causality going 
from the values to the emotions rather than vice versa. The existence of values induces 
certain kinds of emotion when they are followed or not. Emotions are very hard to fake and 
are also observable by other individuals. Since they are hard to fake then they act as a 
reasonably reliable signal to the other individuals as to the underlying values being expressed. 
 
 
 
9. Building blocks of a theory of value 
The discussion above has shown that there is room for a theory of value which 
incorporates the notion of representation from cognitive science. This paper will follow 
through this idea in incorporating it within a game-theoretic model. However, this creates 
problems because there is no accepted way in which representations can be modelled within 
game theory. The usual method of looking at heterogeneity among agents is to use the 
concept of type. However, this is obviously insufficient since types are assumed to be fixed 
for each person and out of the conscious control of the player (Harsanyi 1967) while one can 
always change one’s representation. 
Another method that has been used to allow for context in games is framing (see 
Bacharach 2006 on variable frame theory). However, framing is essentially a property of the 
external world while mental representations exist in the mind. The contrast between the two 
can be seen in an advertising slogan “Beeples washes whiter than other low-cost brands!”. 
This frames Beeples as an efficient clothes detergent. However, this may not affect how 
people perceive Beeples as a brand i.e. their mental representation. (Beeples may have a 
history of causing skin complaints for example). As we have discussed earlier, we will focus 
on the non-objective view of representations (albeit one that is widely held within the 
population). 
 In order to motivate the following discussion we shall introduce the notion of a base 
game. A base game is a normal form game structure G=〈P,S,Q〉 where P is the set of n 
players, S is an n-tuple of pure strategy sets (one for each player) and Q is an n-tuple of 
outcomes. A base game, it should be noted, has no explicitly defined payoffs but only 
outcomes specifying the event that occurs. An outcome may have some material payoffs or it 
may have something which happens which a players likes or approves of. However, this is 
not incorporated within the structure of the base game. Instead the base game illustrates the 
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number of players and the strategies given to each player, while leaving the payoff structure 
open. In this paper we will assume that we are dealing with two player- two strategy base 
games. 
Formally, a representation can be seen as a possible allocation of utilities to the base 
game. There will almost certainly be more than one possible allocation in much the same way 
as there will be more than one possible representation. This means that different 
representations will allocate different utilities to the base game. The intuition behind this is 
that representations are different according to different contexts and different players as 
described in section 6. As a result of these different perceptions, greater or lesser preference 
will be given to one outcome in a game matrix over another. Representations therefore will 
reflect the context-sensitive nature of values in terms of utilities that vary according to the 
situation and the representation of that situation. 
 How representations come into being is still the subject of intensive research. 
However, representations can be summoned from memory, they can be copied from another, 
similar, situation by a process of analogy (c.f. Gentner et al 2001), they could be acquired as 
part of religious instruction or parental guidance or they could be picked up from the mass 
media or by malicious rumours. There are a multitude of ways in which representations can 
be acquired and many of them can conflict with each other. We will assume, following 
Sperber, that these representations are social representations. 
Furthermore, more than one representation can be held in the mind at one time. This 
does not mean that one has to subscribe to all the possible representations that one has in 
one’s mind.  If a person is a voter in a United Kingdom General Election then one may, for 
example, subscribe to Labour party values and vote for the Labour party while having a 
perfectly clear idea of Conservative party values. Likewise, it is possible to change one’s 
mind between different representations. There are two ways in which this could happen. One 
is that a representation may change so that additional justifications for a representation make 
it seem plausible. Another is that circumstances change so that a formerly rejected 
representation seems to be a more plausible way of perceiving the world. In this paper we 
will focus on the mechanics of the latter. 
According to Davidson (1963), actions are caused by reasons. Representations, since 
they consist of a mix of beliefs and desires, provide these reasons in the form of belief-desire 
pairs- each action being justified by one of these pairs. We will assume that individuals are 
minimally rational in the sense that, within a given representation, the reasons for actions are 
not contradictory. So, for example, one cannot choose an apple because one likes the taste of 
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apples but reject a pear because one thinks all fruit tastes disgusting. However, it is quite 
likely that, when comparing reasons for actions across representations, the reasons in 
different representations will contradict each other. 
Assuming minimal rationality leads to a conclusion about modelling- we cannot in 
general model a person as having two active representations at once i.e. individuals cannot 
play mixed actions across two different representations as this would require the individual to 
entertain contradictory reasons underlying the actions. For this reason, any modelling will 
have to be in a situation where individuals only have one active representation at once. This 
suggests that, in population based models, one would model values using, for example, 
evolutionary models where movement comes through individuals changing from wholly 
subscribing to one representation to wholly subscribing to another.  
  As has been argued above, this paper rejects the idea that agents are necessarily self-
interested. Instead, self-interest is one possible attitude that one could incorporate into a 
representation. Such a representation would have utilities that are monotonic with the 
material payoffs in the outcomes. As such, the representation would compete on an equal 
basis with other possible representations. There is no presumption here in favour of self-
interest although it is possible that in many situations, such as when one is trying to preserve 
one’s life, the utilities in the self-interested representation would be very high. 
 The rejection of the idea of self-interest as the only motivational component of a 
representation is what allows the framework put forward here to work. If self-interest is 
imposed as necessary then the scope for differences between representations would be cut 
down to those that are monotonic with the material outcomes- which would be a very meagre 
offering.  
Given the multiple possible motivations, self-interest is modelled within this paper as 
being just one amongst many possible motivations. In fact no distinction is made between 
self-interest and other motivations in that there is no separation between self- interested 
preferences and non-self-interested preferences. All are subsumed under generic preferences 
which may be self –interested or otherwise. Whether a person behaves in a self-interested 
manner depends on the representation. It is likewise assumed that all preferences, whether 
self-interested or not, can be incorporated into a single utility scale. None of this explicitly 
contradicts the von Neumann- Morgenstern theory of utility and games which simply requires 
that preferences satisfy the axioms of expected utility. 
 Strictly it will be assumed that the utilities assigned by representations will be 
expected utilities comprising probabilities and utilities. The utilities represent the valuations 
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prescribed by the representation. The probabilities represent the belief that certain things may 
happen or are the case. This encapsulates the idea that culture and values are partially 
determined by the beliefs of the cultural community. These beliefs may be associated with, 
say, religion or maybe the importance of certain historical events. A Scotsman may, for 
example, value wearing a kilt because he has a belief that it is an item of clothing that has a 
history over a thousand years old8 and also attaches a high utility to that historical 
background. These probabilities are not connected to the proportions of people with 
particular representations in the population. 
 A 2x2 base game can therefore be transformed into an ordinary 2x2 game by the use 
of a representation. Assume that this is an evolutionary symmetric game being played by one 
population of players. In that case the payoff matrix will be as follows:  
 
  Player 2  
  Up Down 
Player 1 Up a,a b,c 
 Down c,b d,d 
 
Where a,b,c,d are all utility payoffs. In that case, according to Weibull (1995)  there 
are four categories of game: 
Category 1:a>c; b>d; this leads to a Nash Equilibrium at (Down, Down) 
Category 2: a>c; b<d: this leads to two Nash Equilibria at (Up,Up) and (Down, 
Down) 
Category 3: a<c; b>d: this leads to a mixed Nash Equilibrium at ( 𝑏𝑏−𝑑𝑑(𝑐𝑐−𝑎𝑎)+(𝑏𝑏−𝑑𝑑) , 𝑏𝑏−𝑑𝑑(𝑐𝑐−𝑎𝑎)+(𝑏𝑏−𝑑𝑑)). 
Category 4:a<c; b<d; this leads to a Nash Equilibrium at (Down, Down) 
 
In this paper it will be claimed that the preferences under given representations 
attached to the base games are to be identified with values.  
Definition: A value is a preference relation between outcomes within a particular 
representation.  
8 This is a false belief- see Trevor-Roper (1983). Beliefs need not be true to be included in a representation. All 
such probabilities are assumed to subjective.  
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Even though the model has not been fully explained, one can see that this method has 
the advantage of satisfying some of the criteria for a theory of value. First of all, not all 
values can be detected by a researcher through revealed preference. In a category 2 
representation, the population may converge to playing (Down,Down) but this simply reveals 
that d>b. It does not reveal that a>c. The latter would have to be discovered by a researcher 
by other means. This fits in with the idea that values do not always correspond to actual 
choices. 
Secondly, the use of representations is context sensitive. Different contexts evoke 
different representations and these in turn evoke different utilities as payoffs in the game. The 
use of representations therefore explains why a given base game with the same actions (e.g. 
whether or not to tell a joke) may result in different actions being chosen in different contexts 
(a dinner party versus a funeral). Representations also explain why different cultures choose 
different actions in similar choice situations. This is because different cultures provide 
different reasons and hence different representations for choosing one action over another. 
However, it is insufficient simply to assert the existence of representations. One has to 
understand why agents within a society come to hold one representation rather than another. 
In particular, since economists and other social scientists are interested in humans en masse 
rather than individuals, why some representations are more widespread than others. One also 
has to understand why such representations are long- lived- why do they survive while others 
die out comparatively quickly?  
To start to answer these questions one needs to understand how representations 
become attached to base games. One can discern three possibilities. The first is where there is 
an already existing unique representation that can be retrieved from memory or can be 
acquired by copying other people or by comparing with analogous situations. In this case one 
simply applies the given representation to the base game and actions are carried out based on 
the utilities provided.  The second circumstance is where there are no representations for a 
base game at all. This would occur in a novel situation where the agent has no knowledge 
about how to proceed. In such a situation the agent must deliberate about what to do in this 
situation and create a new representation, possibly based on analogies with partially similar 
situations and partly from applying general principles. Once created such a representation 
then becomes available for other situations in a similar way to Raz’s theory of values. 
 The final case is where there are two or more representations available for a given 
base game. This case is more complex and will be the focus of the rest of the paper. It will be 
assumed that these representations all pass the criteria laid out by Sperber for a social 
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representation i.e. they are easy to remember and understand, there must be some reason for 
holding them and they must be credible. If this is the case then the representations will in 
likelihood be held by large numbers of people. 
This leaves us with the problem of how agents pick a representation of a particular 
situation to assign utilities to the base game. It is claimed here that the process of picking a 
representation is a conscious intentional process by the agent. As such it is a species of 
mental action. Mental actions are processes in the mind that have as their goal another mental 
process (Proust 2001). Examples of mental actions are easy to come across. One may try to 
remember when the bus is going to leave. A purchaser may try to work out what the VAT is 
on a purchase of window frames. A student tries to concentrate on a lecture. In each case an 
agent is deliberately trying to engage some mental faculty. 
This notion of mental action is quite old and goes back to the Enlightenment. Locke 
(1689/1998) believed that the mind deliberating and operating on itself and its own ideas was 
the bedrock of philosophy. Geach (1957) presents a more recent 20th Century view of mental 
acts, particularly in relation to judgment. Mental actions are therefore much the same as 
ordinary, physical actions in that they have a goal, are intentional and are not the result of 
unconscious thought. As intentional actions they can be rationalised by the beliefs and desires 
attached to the action- in other words the beliefs and desires motivate the action and act as a 
causal explanation for that action (Davidson 1963). 
 It follows that one can model the picking of one representation out of several9 as a 
simple choice between actions as one would do with ordinary physical actions. This way of 
modelling representations is not unusual as Henrich and Boyd’s (2002) first model is 
essentially a model of this process within a population. However, the model presented here is 
the first to put this explicitly within a game- theoretic context.  
Each representation is motivated by beliefs and desires and the usual way to represent 
beliefs and desires in economics is through the use of probabilities and utilities. This means 
that not only does each representation allocate utilities to the outcomes of a base game but 
also there are utilities attached to the choice of each representation. It is assumed that utilities 
attached to outcomes can be easily integrated with the utility attached to choosing a 
representation. 
One possible problem that could arise is that, when one is assigning a set of utilities to 
a base game, the utilities are qualitatively different across representations. This is because a 
9 Note that this notion of choice of representations is similar to a choice in descriptions as outlined by Sen 
(1980) 
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utility under a representation is conditioned on that representation and hence that particular 
way of understanding the situation. It will be assumed, without further investigation, that 
these utilities can be made consistent with each other across representations10. It should be 
noted that this is simply a measurement issue related to the consistency of the expected utility 
measures- it does not bear on the fact that different representations may have reasons that 
contradict each other. 
Given that a choice is made between representations then the question has to be asked 
as to why representations cannot be changed simply to suit the convenience of the agent. If 
one ends up in an unfavourable situation as a result of adopting a representation then why can 
one not simply rewrite one’s representation? It will be seen that the choice of representation 
is part of an extended game where one is brought into equilibrium in strategies in the base 
game but also in representations. Representations are therefore fixed by being in equilibrium. 
Rewriting a representation creates an additional strategy in a new game which also has its 
own equilibrium which also fixes the representations. 
As mentioned above, we will focus here on changes in choices as a result of changes 
in numbers in a population holding a particular representation and the utilities attached to that 
representation. As Ross and Nisbett (1991) point out, other people are generally one’s best 
source of information on the world around us and so the initial spread of representations in 
the population will assumed to be by a process of diffusion of social representations. It has 
been shown that most people dislike being in tension with the group of people around them 
and will not only vary their behaviour but also their understanding of a situation in order to 
fit in. This suggests that not only will one’s strategy choice in the base game change in line 
with that of the group and one’s utilities but also one’s choice of representation as well.    
  It is assumed, following the discussion in section 8 that values evoke emotions and 
that these emotions can, fallibly, be observed by other people. It follows that we will make 
the same assumption in the model which we are building and we will assume that the other 
player’s chosen representation will be available to a given player. While it is acknowledged, 
following Frank (1988) that this is costly, this costliness will not have any effect on the 
model since the costs will be the same whichever representation is chosen. To avoid the 
complications caused by some members of the population not knowing another’s 
representation, we will simply assume that everyone knows which representation is chosen 
by one’s opponent.   
10 One possibility is to impose contraction and expansion consistency on the representation- dependent utilities 
as in Sen (1997). However, this goes beyond the scope of the paper. 
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 10. The model  
 
The preceding discussion leads on to a very simple modelling strategy for values. 
Every person who plays a game first of all chooses a representation and, given the utilities 
attached to the base game, then chooses an action to play in the base game. We will refer to 
the choice of (behavioural) strategy at the representational level as a choice of representation 
while the choice of behavioural strategy in the modified base game will be called the physical 
strategy. 
 Choices of physical strategy in the modified base game and representational choice is 
determined simultaneously in equilibrium. In this paper we will concentrate on the simplest 
case where there are two available representations and two strategies for each of the two 
players. Given that each player has two representations, this suggests that there are four 
different combinations of representation possible.  
The model has the structure of a sequential, two-player, symmetric, evolutionary 
game with one population and no moves by nature.  More precisely, it is a two stage- two 
strategy, simultaneity game where payoffs are cumulative between stages (Cressman 2003 p. 
192). This means that, when playing a game the two players simultaneously choose their 
representation and then, once the representations have been chosen, they choose which action 
to play given the utilities established by the representation. This leads to an extensive form 
game with four subgames, each in the form of a 2x2 normal form game. It is assumed that the 
player knows which combination of representations is held by both players before they 
choose their actions. A stochastic element will be added to the model to represent variation in 
utilities. 
Cressman (2003) has put forward a method by which extensive form games can be 
modelled by evolutionary methods while still taking into account the sequential nature of 
actions within the game. Cressman demonstrates that one can decompose a replicator 
dynamic for the normal form of the whole game into separate replicator dynamics for the 
subgames and the truncated game. This can be done by assuming that the replicator operates 
on the Wright Manifold- the combination of probability points where the choice of strategy in 
one subgame is independent of the choice of the same strategy in another subgame. The game 
as a whole can be brought into equilibrium by first of all finding the equilibria of the 
subgames and then substituting one from each into the truncated game.  It can be shown that 
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when the subgame and truncated game replicators converge on an equilibrium point then this 
is a subgame perfect equilibrium for the whole game.   
   The game as a whole is played by one population. In normal form this is fairly 
straightforward as this just requires a one-population set of equations for the strategies played 
in the game. When the game is decomposed according to the Wright manifold then, for the 
truncated game and any symmetric subgame, the situation is still the same. Each one is 
treated as a smaller, one-population game. In the case of a two-stage, two strategy 
simultaneity game this would mean that each symmetric subgame and the overall truncated 
game would have a one-equation replicator dynamic equation. 
 However in such symmetric extensive form games, there will always be asymmetric 
subgames as well as symmetric subgames. In this particular type of game there will be two 
such games. This means that it is not appropriate to treat these games as symmetric. 
However, it is also not appropriate to treat the two sides of the game as members of different 
populations as it is assumed that the whole game is played with one population. In this case 
Cressman recommends treating the two games as components of a single linked asymmetric 
game where each “player” in the game is actually a role selected within the game by a player 
from a unified population. One set of choices leads to the player playing one side of the game 
while another set of choices leads to them playing the other side of the game. 
 The replicator dynamics used in this model are used as an approximation to social 
learning rather than having a biological context. As such one can see members of a 
population as having a tendency to play a given strategy, the greater the difference in 
expected utilities between one strategy and the average expected utility of all strategies. The 
biological interpretations of the replicator dynamics involving concepts such as fitness, 
reproduction and multiple biological generations are ignored here (see Binmore 1988 for one 
possible interpretation along these lines). 
Each game played by the population has the structure in figure 1. R1 and R2 represent 
the representational choices made by player 1 and player 2. The information set covering 
player 2’s nodes implies that each person chooses their information set simultaneously, 
although the nature of their choices is known to each other later on in the game. The 
subgames starting from u1, u2, u3, u4 represent the different interpreted versions of the base 
game. The subgames emerging from u1 and u4 represent the situation where both players have 
chosen the same representation. The asymmetric subgames following from u2 and u3 
represent situations where the two players have chosen different representations. 
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{Figure 1 Here} 
 
  The strategies in the game correspond to the two types of action discussed above. R1 
and R2 correspond to the mental actions of choosing representation 1 and representation 2. U 
and D are physical actions corresponding to moves in the base game. These are the moves 
that actually result in a material outcome being achieved. 
It is assumed that any utility deriving purely from the use of representations is 
incorporated into the final utilities in the terminal nodes. It is also assumed that, if a player 
chooses a certain representation and physical action (given their opponent’s physical actions) 
then they will have the same payoff irrespective of the representation chosen by their 
opponent. This means that a player’s final payoffs are not influenced by the representation 
chosen by one’s opponent. 
 The use of this model allows us to model many of the basic facets of the discussion 
above. The choice of representation is a mental action where individuals deliberately choose 
which representation to use in analysing the situation. The extensive form structure of the 
game allows this mental action to be taken prior to the physical action and represents a 
settling of the mind of the player on one particular interpretation. The simultaneous choice of 
representations by agents models the fact that agents do not know each other’s choices before 
they make their own. 
 It is assumed that players know each other’s representations before they play their 
physical actions. This reflects the previous discussion of Frank’s and Mandel’s work where it 
was assumed that one’s view of the world would be accessible to the other player as a result 
of the visibility of their value-induced emotions. Meanwhile the evolutionary structure allows 
one to explain the intuition common to Raz and Sperber that values are essentially social 
phenomena that emerge through social interaction in the population. 
 More specifically, the model also catches Raz’s intuition that the occurrence of 
values depend on social practices. If one sees the physical games being played as social 
practices then the representations that are selected out by the evolutionary processes can be 
seen to depend for their existence on those practices11.  
1111 It may be wondered why the agent doesn’t simply pick a representation according to his own self-interest. 
However, this model allows for other attitudes apart from self-interest- among them an interest in accuracy and 
objectivity which would pull against self-interested motives. On the other hand, this model does allow for the 
possibility that self-interest may overcome an interest in accuracy. This would be the case where the agent 
suffers from wishful thinking. 
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Similarly there is a stochastic element in the model to model Sperber’s idea that 
representations are continuously reinterpreted. The “attraction” model put forward by Sperber 
suggests that agents can interpret situations in a variety of ways that lead to deviations from 
the original “attractor” interpretation. However these deviations eventually converge on the 
attractor. Since interpretations of a situation cannot be predicted, this reinterpretation process 
(following Henrich & Boyd 2002) is best rendered by a stochastic process in which the mean 
of the process stands in as the attractor.  
It is further assumed that the main effect of this reinterpretation process is to change 
the utilities in each outcome and does not affect choices of physical strategies. As it is usually 
assumed in game theory that everything affecting preference would be included within the 
utility numbers, this is followed here. It should be noted (following Sperber 1996) that this 
idea of stochastic choice is population based in that different interpretations diffuse through 
the population. This means that there is no sense that the reinterpretations cancel each other 
out. Any other effects of reinterpretation are assumed to be irrelevant and are not included. 
This notion of stochastic preferences is related to the idea of random utility (Becker 
1963). It is assumed that each payoff is a random utility consisting of a baseline (or mean) 
utility with a stochastic variation.  Under each representation there is a different stochastic 
variation although it is assumed that within each representation the stochastic terms are the 
same. 
Note that the game allows for two representations to be chosen which lead to four 
subgames (with roots at u1,u2,u3 and u4). The subgames following from u1 and u4 will be 
referred to as symmetric subgames and correspond with the following normal form matrices 
(ignoring the stochastic element and looking at the mean utilities): 
 
  Player 2  
  U D 
Player 1 U a,a b,c 
 D c,b d,d 
 
And 
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  Player 2  
  U D 
Player 1 U w,w x,y 
 D y,x z,z 
 
 
It follows that there are two asymmetric subgames following from u2 and u3. Given 
the use of Cressman’s model these can be seen as two different roles in one conventional 
asymmetric game as shown in the matrix below: 
 Player 2 (From u3) 
Player 1 
(From u2) 
 U D 
U a,w b,y 
D c,x d,z 
  
This means that, when a player reaches u2, then they will take the role of player 1 in a 
two-population asymmetric evolutionary game while if a player reaches u3 then they take the 
role of player 2 in that game.  
The structure of the games means that the subgames act as representations of the 
original base game. Nothing is said within the model as to the relationship between any 
material payoffs in the base game and the representational subgames within the game in 
figure 1. The model does not deny that some links may exist but simply does not make them 
explicit. This is completely conventional- strictly, within Von Neumann and Morgenstern’s 
(1953) game theory, all payoffs are in terms of utilities and none of the material payoffs are 
specified. In addition to this, the conventional theory of utility makes no assumptions about 
self-interest and neither does the current theory. This means that the scope of the theory is 
very broad.  
 Furthermore, the current theory can be seen as an extension of that of von Neumann 
and Morgenstern. While their theory deals with a state where only one representation is 
available to people in a population, the current theory allows for the much broader idea that 
there are multiple representations, each having a different distribution of utilities. Likewise, 
the notion of mental action is implicit in game theory as an attempt to focus on the game and 
to make a decision based on the utilities (which have implicitly been assigned by a unique 
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representation). It is only with the introduction of multiple representations that the role of 
mental actions becomes explicit as a choice between representations. 
 For the purposes of this paper the representations consist of symmetric games using 
the four categories outlined in section 9. It is assumed that even if the two representations in 
each game are in the same category (i.e. if the utilities in each representation have the same 
ordering) they still have different cardinal utilities.  This gives some idea as to what happens 
when one has similar but not identical representations of a situation or when different parts of 
a population have different levels of “enthusiasm” for a similar view of a situation. 
 In order to abbreviate the representational content of different models the following 
notation will be used: 
The term (XvY) will be used to denote when a game involves a representation formed 
from category X and a representation formed from category Y. So, for example, (1v2) means 
that the game has two representations from categories 1 and 2. The representation from 
category 1 would be represented by utilities a, b, c,d while the representation from category 2 
would be represented by utilities w,x,y,z. Given the overall symmetry of the game, it can be 
seen that there is no difference if the two categories are interchanged.  
 
 
 
11. Model Layout 
Given the modelling strategy used above, then the extensive form game shown in 
figure 1 can be modelled as a one population evolutionary game using the replicator dynamic. 
We will assume that that, given a mean utility of  u, the standard deviation of the utility 
would be σR1 under representation 1 and σR2 under representation 2 where R1 and R2 stand 
for “Representation 1” and “Representation 2” respectively. It is assumed that the stochastic 
terms varies over time according to the Wiener process.   
First of all, examine the normal form of the game outlined above. This game is one 
with eight strategies (see appendix). The proportions of the population playing a given 
strategy si is qi. p represents the mixed strategy played by one’s opponent, while the payoff 
from playing a strategy si is represented by π (si/p). The stochastic differential equation for 
playing s1 is given by: 
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𝑑𝑑𝑞𝑞1 = 𝑞𝑞1 �(𝜋𝜋(𝑠𝑠1/𝑝𝑝)𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 +  𝜎𝜎𝑅𝑅1𝑑𝑑𝑊𝑊1)
− ���𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖(𝜋𝜋(𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖/𝑝𝑝)𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 +  𝜎𝜎𝑅𝑅1𝑑𝑑𝑊𝑊1)4
𝑖𝑖=1
� +  ��𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖(𝜋𝜋(𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖/𝑝𝑝)𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 + 𝜎𝜎𝑅𝑅2𝑑𝑑𝑊𝑊2)8
𝑖𝑖=5
��� 
 
Where 𝜎𝜎𝑅𝑅1 and 𝜎𝜎𝑅𝑅2 are standard deviations and W1 and W2 are Random variables 
from a Wiener process. 
Similar equations can be constructed for q2, q3 etc. These equations, as is shown in 
appendix 1, can be decomposed into one stochastic equation for the truncated game and four 
deterministic equations for the subgames. Suppose that PR1 represents the probability that R1 
is chosen in the truncated game while 𝑞𝑞𝑈𝑈
𝑢𝑢𝑥𝑥 is the probability that U is chosen in the subgame 
following ux (x=1,2,3,4).  
The stochastic equation for the truncated game is: 
         Eq (1)……  𝑑𝑑𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅1 = 𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅1(1 − 𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅1)�(𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅1𝑛𝑛�1 + (1 − 𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅1)𝑛𝑛�2) − (𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅1𝑛𝑛�3 + (1 − 𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅1)𝑛𝑛�4)�𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 +
𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅1(1 − 𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅1)𝜎𝜎𝑑𝑑𝑊𝑊. 
 
Here, 𝑛𝑛�𝑥𝑥 are the equilibrium expected values of the subgames following from ux . 
Also:    
𝜎𝜎 = �(𝜎𝜎𝑅𝑅12 + 𝜎𝜎𝑅𝑅22 ) 
And 
𝑊𝑊 = (𝜎𝜎𝑅𝑅1𝑊𝑊1 − 𝜎𝜎𝑅𝑅2𝑊𝑊2)
𝜎𝜎
 
 
It should be noted that this looks similar to the equation in Fudenberg and Harris 
(1992) and indeed has many of the same properties in that negative population shares are 
avoided and the boundary points are steady states of the system, never achieved in finite time. 
However, the process by which this equation is created differs substantially from that 
outlined by Fudenberg and Harris.  In Fudenberg and Harris the stochastic shock is attached 
to the system when it is expressed in terms of absolute population sizes using particular 
strategies. Specifically, it is added to the utility term in the population based replicator 
dynamic. Fudenberg and Harris then transform this stochastic replicator equation using Ito’s 
27 
 
Lemma on the proportion of a population using a particular strategy. They justify this 
procedure by claiming that, under the biological approach, the absolute population is more 
fundamental and it is easier to interpret stochastic shocks as due to aggregate effects. 
 However, the framework adopted here uses a social interpretation of the replicator 
dynamic and, given that the source of the stochastic process is the result of aggregate 
“interpretational shocks” i.e. social causes rather than natural causes, it makes little sense to 
interpret the replicator dynamic in terms of absolute population levels. 
The four deterministic equations for the subgames are as follows: 
Equation 2 
?̇?𝑞𝑈𝑈
𝑢𝑢1 = 𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅1𝑞𝑞𝑈𝑈𝑢𝑢1 �𝑞𝑞𝑈𝑈𝑢𝑢1𝑎𝑎 + �1 − 𝑞𝑞𝑈𝑈𝑢𝑢1�𝑏𝑏
− �𝑞𝑞𝑈𝑈
𝑢𝑢1�𝑞𝑞𝑈𝑈
𝑢𝑢1𝑎𝑎 + �1 − 𝑞𝑞𝑈𝑈𝑢𝑢1�𝑏𝑏� + (1 − 𝑞𝑞𝑈𝑈𝑢𝑢1)(𝑞𝑞𝑈𝑈𝑢𝑢1𝑐𝑐 + �1 − 𝑞𝑞𝑈𝑈𝑢𝑢1�𝑑𝑑�� 
Equation 3 
?̇?𝑞𝑈𝑈
𝑢𝑢2 = (1 − 𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅1)𝑞𝑞𝑈𝑈𝑢𝑢2 �𝑞𝑞𝑈𝑈𝑢𝑢3𝑎𝑎 + �1 − 𝑞𝑞𝑈𝑈𝑢𝑢3�𝑏𝑏
− �𝑞𝑞𝑈𝑈
𝑢𝑢2�𝑞𝑞𝑈𝑈
𝑢𝑢3𝑎𝑎 + �1 − 𝑞𝑞𝑈𝑈𝑢𝑢3�𝑏𝑏� + (1 − 𝑞𝑞𝑈𝑈𝑢𝑢2)(𝑞𝑞𝑈𝑈𝑢𝑢3𝑐𝑐 + �1 − 𝑞𝑞𝑈𝑈𝑢𝑢3�𝑑𝑑�� 
 
Equation 4 
?̇?𝑞𝑈𝑈
𝑢𝑢3 = 𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅1𝑞𝑞𝑈𝑈𝑢𝑢3 �𝑞𝑞𝑈𝑈𝑢𝑢2𝑤𝑤 + �1 − 𝑞𝑞𝑈𝑈𝑢𝑢2�𝑥𝑥
− �𝑞𝑞𝑈𝑈
𝑢𝑢3�𝑞𝑞𝑈𝑈
𝑢𝑢2𝑤𝑤 + �1 − 𝑞𝑞𝑈𝑈𝑢𝑢2�𝑥𝑥� + (1 − 𝑞𝑞𝑈𝑈𝑢𝑢3)(𝑞𝑞𝑈𝑈𝑢𝑢2𝑦𝑦 + �1 − 𝑞𝑞𝑈𝑈𝑢𝑢2�𝑧𝑧�� 
 
Equation 5 
?̇?𝑞𝑈𝑈
𝑢𝑢4 = (1 − 𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅1)𝑞𝑞𝑈𝑈𝑢𝑢4 �𝑞𝑞𝑈𝑈𝑢𝑢4𝑤𝑤 + �1 − 𝑞𝑞𝑈𝑈𝑢𝑢4�𝑥𝑥
− �𝑞𝑞𝑈𝑈
𝑢𝑢4�𝑞𝑞𝑈𝑈
𝑢𝑢4𝑤𝑤 + �1 − 𝑞𝑞𝑈𝑈𝑢𝑢4�𝑥𝑥� + (1 − 𝑞𝑞𝑈𝑈𝑢𝑢4)(𝑞𝑞𝑈𝑈𝑢𝑢4𝑦𝑦 + �1 − 𝑞𝑞𝑈𝑈𝑢𝑢4�𝑧𝑧�� 
 
The decomposition of the normal form equations and the elimination of the stochastic 
elements is demonstrated in Appendix 1. 
It will be noted that all of the equations have the form of replicator dynamics up to the 
multiplying of the formula by either PR1 or (1-PR1) which has no effect on the direction of the 
trajectories. Note that equations (3) and (4) are interlinked which reflects their role as 
describing two roles in one interlinked asymmetric game. 
Given that these are now, effectively, replicator dynamics over two- strategy games 
the equations can be rearranged as follows: 
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Equation 2* 
?̇?𝑞𝑈𝑈
𝑢𝑢1 = 𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅1𝑞𝑞𝑈𝑈𝑢𝑢1(1 − 𝑞𝑞𝑈𝑈𝑢𝑢1)�𝑞𝑞𝑈𝑈𝑢𝑢1(𝑎𝑎 − 𝑐𝑐) + �1 − 𝑞𝑞𝑈𝑈𝑢𝑢1�(𝑏𝑏 − 𝑑𝑑)� 
Equation 3* 
?̇?𝑞𝑈𝑈
𝑢𝑢2 = (1 − 𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅1)𝑞𝑞𝑈𝑈𝑢𝑢2(1 − 𝑞𝑞𝑈𝑈𝑢𝑢2)�𝑞𝑞𝑈𝑈𝑢𝑢3(𝑎𝑎 − 𝑐𝑐) + �1 − 𝑞𝑞𝑈𝑈𝑢𝑢3�(𝑏𝑏 − 𝑑𝑑)� 
Equation 4* 
?̇?𝑞𝑈𝑈
𝑢𝑢3 = 𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅1𝑞𝑞𝑈𝑈𝑢𝑢3(1 − 𝑞𝑞𝑈𝑈𝑢𝑢3)�𝑞𝑞𝑈𝑈𝑢𝑢2(𝑤𝑤 − 𝑦𝑦) + �1 − 𝑞𝑞𝑈𝑈𝑢𝑢2�(𝑥𝑥 − 𝑧𝑧)� 
Equation 5* 
?̇?𝑞𝑈𝑈
𝑢𝑢4 = (1 − 𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅1)𝑞𝑞𝑈𝑈𝑢𝑢4(1 − 𝑞𝑞𝑈𝑈𝑢𝑢4)�𝑞𝑞𝑈𝑈𝑢𝑢4(𝑤𝑤 − 𝑦𝑦) + �1 − 𝑞𝑞𝑈𝑈𝑢𝑢4�(𝑥𝑥 − 𝑧𝑧)� 
 
The stochastic equation for the truncated game needs further analysis to demonstrate 
what happens asymptotically to the proportions of representations in the population: 
Define three integrals: 
 
𝐼𝐼1 = � 𝑒𝑒𝑥𝑥𝑝𝑝 �−� �2𝜃𝜃(𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅1)𝛽𝛽(𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅1)2� 𝑑𝑑𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅1𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅1𝛼𝛼 � 𝑑𝑑𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅1𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅1(0)0  
 
𝐼𝐼2 = � 𝑒𝑒𝑥𝑥𝑝𝑝 �−� �2𝜃𝜃(𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅1)𝛽𝛽(𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅1)2� 𝑑𝑑𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅1𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅1𝛼𝛼 � 𝑑𝑑𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅11𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅1(0)  
 
𝑀𝑀(𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅1) = 2𝜎𝜎2 𝑒𝑒𝑥𝑥𝑝𝑝 �� �2𝜃𝜃(𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅1)𝛽𝛽(𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅1)2� 𝑑𝑑𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅1𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅1𝛼𝛼 � 
 
 
Where 𝜃𝜃(𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅1)= 𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅1(1 − 𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅1)�(𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅1𝑛𝑛�1 + (1 − 𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅1)𝑛𝑛�2) − (𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅1𝑛𝑛�3 + (1 − 𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅1)𝑛𝑛�4)� 
  And: 𝛽𝛽(𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅1)= 𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅1(1 − 𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅1)𝜎𝜎 
PR1(0) is the initial position. 
From these we can use a revised version of a proposition from Fudenberg and Harris 
that will establish the asymptotic behaviour of the truncated game equation. 
Proposition 1 (Revised from Fudenberg and Harris 1992): 
1) If 𝑛𝑛�2 − 𝑛𝑛�4 > 𝜎𝜎22  and 𝑛𝑛�3 − 𝑛𝑛�1 < 𝜎𝜎22   then PR1→1 as t→∞ with probability 1 
2) If 𝑛𝑛�2 − 𝑛𝑛�4 < 𝜎𝜎22  and 𝑛𝑛�3 − 𝑛𝑛�1 > 𝜎𝜎22 then PR1→0 as t→∞ with probability 1 
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3) If 𝑛𝑛�2 − 𝑛𝑛�4 > 𝜎𝜎22  and 𝑛𝑛�3 − 𝑛𝑛�1 > 𝜎𝜎22 then PR1→1as t→∞ with probability I1/(I1+I2) and 
PR1→0 as t→∞ with probability I2/(I1+I2) 
4) If 𝑛𝑛�2 − 𝑛𝑛�4 < 𝜎𝜎22  and 𝑛𝑛�3 − 𝑛𝑛�1 < 𝜎𝜎22  then  
 
𝑃𝑃( lim
𝑡𝑡→∞
𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅1 = 0) = 𝑃𝑃( lim
𝑡𝑡→∞
𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅1 = 1) = 1 
 
Also the system possesses a unique ergodic distribution 𝑀𝑀(𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅1)
∫ 𝑀𝑀(𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅1)𝑑𝑑𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅110   to which the 
distribution of PR1 converges as t→∞. 
 
This proposition establishes the long run behaviour for categories 1 and 4 in 
representations demonstrating that as long as the deterministic process is strong enough then 
the population will converge on representation 1 for category 1 payoffs and on representation 
2 for category 4 payoffs. It also shows that category 2 converges on one of the two pure 
equilibria representations depending on which basin of attraction the initial state starts in. In 
the category 3 case we know that the system converges on an ergodic equilibrium 
distribution. 
One issue that must be discussed before analysing the model is the issue of stability 
within the model as a whole. In order for equilibrium to emerge for the model as a whole, 
Cressman (p. 193-4 Theorem 7.2.1 and footnote 4) points out that there cannot be cycles 
within the subgames. This is not a problem for the symmetric subgames where the 
decomposed replicator dynamics act as if within one population games and so all Nash 
equilibria are strict. However, within the asymmetric subgames this is a problem since they 
act like a linked two population game where cycles are possible.  
The main problem is the so- called “Buyer Seller” game which is a non-degenerate, 
two- strategy bimatrix game (see Cressman p.78). In this case the replicator dynamics trace 
out cycles and do not converge towards the unique mixed Nash equilibrium. An examination 
of the (2v3) and (3v2) category combinations applied to the asymmetric subgames shows that 
the corresponding linked asymmetric game is identical to the Buyer-Seller game. Since no 
other category combinations in the linked asymmetric subgames are identical to the Buyer-
Seller game and the Buyer-Seller game is the only one that causes these cycles it follows that 
the (2v3) and (3v2) category combinations are the only ones that cause this problem. 
30 
 
It follows, therefore, that the (2v3) and (3v2) category combinations should be 
excluded from any analysis of the model if one wishes to achieve a stable equilibrium. 
However, this makes perfect sense within the literature, especially in Raz’s (2003) theory of 
values. For Raz, values emerge because of the existence of a sustaining practice. For 
something to be a practice it follows that it must be stable. Given that, under this model, a 
strategy played in a subgame is a practice then it can only be stable if it is in a stable, non-
cyclical equilibrium. It follows that (2v3) and (3v2) must be excluded on theoretical grounds 
as well as mathematical grounds.  
 Another theoretical implication of the exclusion of the (2v3) and (3v2) category 
combinations is that there are no stable mixed equilibria in the asymmetric subgames. This is 
because the asymmetric subgames are parts of an asymmetric linked game where the two 
roles in the game act in the same way as two different populations. In such a case (2v3) and 
(3v2) are the only combinations that result in a unique interior equilibrium. In all other cases 
the interior equilibrium either doesn’t exist or is not stable. 
 
12. Specific properties of the model 
 
The model outlined above is designed to explain the incidence of particular values 
within a population. Each representation encompasses a different set of utility numbers to be 
attached to the base game. Each utility number is a value in that it shows, given a particular 
representation, how much one outcome is valued.  Another representation would give another 
set of values in a game. The model given here shows us how different sets of values may 
compete and survive against each other.  
As such, we would expect this model to tell us something about culture in general 
insofar as culture consists of value judgements. How far can different value- systems coexist 
within a society when the society satisfies the model assumptions? Will one value system be 
wiped out by the dominance of the other one or is there a natural tendency for value systems 
to survive quite happily together? Such questions have obvious relevance for multicultural 
societies where different value systems may exist within the same society. 
This leads on to particular questions that can be asked within the model. Naturally, 
this model is limited in that it only focusses on two possible representations and two possible 
physical strategies. Any real world system could have large numbers of both. However, the 
model does allow us to think clearly about how physical actions (i.e. the observable actions) 
interact with representations (i.e. people’s values). 
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 One point that must be made straightaway is that, within the model, an overwhelming 
majority of the possible permutations of representations end up with the entire population 
holding one representation. This can easily be seen by examining the properties of the 
truncated game. The truncated game is essentially a one-population, two- strategy 
evolutionary game where the strategies are mental actions selecting representations. In most 
cases we end up with the four possibilities outlined by Weibull (1995) for generic games 
which are the same as the four categories used for subgames12. For three possibilities the 
population will end up with just one representation. It is only for the mixed equilibrium 
(Category 3 applied to the truncated game) that we will end up with more than one 
representation within a population. It follows that it is rare to have a situation where more 
than one set of values exists in equilibrium within a population. 
  Another point is that the vast bulk of the possible permutations of representations 
also end up with the entire population playing one strategy.  This can be seen by realising that 
for the population to end up playing different strategies involves either mixed strategies in the 
truncated game or in the subgames (or both). Since only one case in the four possibilities 
outlined by Weibull (1995) allows mixed strategies (together with the case outlined in 
proposition 2 below) whether in the truncated game or the subgames then it follows that the 
majority of the time the population will follow just one strategy. 
 It follows that, in the bulk of cases, there will be little evidence of differences 
between different parts of the population. However, this does not mean that there will be no 
interesting cases. One question that is of interest is whether it is possible to have a stable 
situation where one part of the population has a set of values that results in them playing a 
given physical strategy while the other part of the population has a different set of values that 
results in them playing the second physical strategy. This speaks to an important part of 
multicultural ideas as to whether different cultures can coexist in the same population. 
 
 
Proposition 2: 
If a population converges to a situation where two representations coexist in a 
population in a stochastic equilibrium governed by the probability distribution: 𝑀𝑀(𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅1)
∫ 𝑀𝑀(𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅1)𝑑𝑑𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅110  
then a player with one representation plays just one pure physical strategy and a player with 
12 It is possible (such as (1v1) or (4v4)) to end up with repeated payoffs in the truncated game. However, this 
simply restricts the equilibrium possibilities only to pure strategies and will result in convergence to a unique 
representation. 
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the other representation plays the other physical strategy iff the category combinations are 
(4v1) or (1v4). 
Proof: See Appendix 1 
 
It follows that such a situation is possible- one can have uniform blocs where 
everyone with one set of values does one thing and everyone with another set of values does 
another. However, theoretically, this is a rare situation compared to the likelihood of the 
population converging on one set of values or there existing a mixture of values and physical 
strategies. Furthermore, perhaps ironically in a multicultural context, this situation can only 
occur where the values are diametrically opposite to each other. 
Another question that is of importance is whether we can have different values within 
a population but with everyone playing the same physical strategy? This is of obvious 
importance in a multicultural society as the different values would not “matter” and potential 
clashes would be avoided. One would have different routes to the same conclusion. 
Unfortunately this possibility is not allowed within the current model: 
Proposition 3: 
It is not possible to have a situation where there is a stochastic equilibrium probability 
distribution  𝑀𝑀(𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅1)
∫ 𝑀𝑀(𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅1)𝑑𝑑𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅110  over proportions of representations held by a population and where 
all physical strategies are the same pure strategy. 
Proof: See Appendix 1 
 
Even allowing for this, it is interesting to see whether we can have the opposite 
situation. In other words, can we have a situation where we have two sets of values coexisting 
and both strategies are being played by people holding either set of values? In such a situation 
we would have a “totally mixed” population in which representations and physical strategies 
can be played in any combination. Again, this would reflect a valued situation within a 
multicultural society. 
 
Proposition 4  
A population will have a stable equilibrium in representations with probability 
distribution 𝑀𝑀(𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅1)
∫ 𝑀𝑀(𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅1)𝑑𝑑𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅110   and with a mixture of physical strategies played under both 
representations only if the game has a category combination (3v3). 
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 Proof: See Appendix 1 
 
Apart from this, the playing of mixed strategies tends to be more where a population 
converges on one representation. This, again, is a result of the operation of the replicator 
dynamic on the truncated game. In most preference permutations the population will simply 
converge to a pure strategies equilibrium. In such a situation, the playing of multiple 
strategies within a population will be the result of playing a category 3 game in either or both 
of the symmetric subgames. Ironically, therefore, differences in values would not be a major 
force in driving behaviour and differing plays of physical strategies would most often emerge 
from everyone having the same set of values. 
 
13. Discussion  
 
The model outlined above is a simple construction aimed at creating a basic 
framework in which we can discuss the origins and spread of values. As such it ignores many 
of the basic channels through which values are spread such as via parental nurturing, 
education, the mass media, law etc. The aim has been to strip the creation and spread of 
values down to its absolute basic framework. However, the model is different from many of 
the biology- influenced models put forward before. Values in this model are not seen as 
unexplained “traits” passed down the generations or across a population but rather as a 
special type of preference which is characterised as being stable, context sensitive and widely 
held. The aim in this model is to take account of the psychological underpinnings of values in 
terms of emotion, interpretation and contextual sensitivity.  
 Given this, a simple evolutionary model was created that incorporated these issues 
into an extensive form game. This allows values to be split apart from physical actions while 
modelling the interactions between the two. Despite the simplicity of the model, some results 
can be deduced from the model. The propositions given above show what happens in a 
“classic” multicultural setting where there are more than one set of values coexisting in a 
population. It turns out that this setting is harder to achieve than may be thought and one such 
setting- where we have different sets of values but with everyone playing the same physical 
strategy, simply cannot exist as a stable stochastic equilibrium. Some other plausible settings 
such as those put forward in propositions 2 and 4 show that even populations with different 
strategies being played only coexist in particular ways when we have different values. 
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   However, the most straightforward, and arguably the most interesting result, is that 
in the vast bulk of possible cases, the population will simply converge on one set of values. 
Indeed, even situations where there is a mixed equilibrium of physical strategies usually 
happen when the population only holds one set of values. It follows that, given the 
assumptions of the model, one would expect a population to converge on value uniformity 
with everyone sharing the same set of values. This undermines the notion that a multicultural 
society can survive without external “help”. 
  This last result means that, if one is to set up a multicultural society with values 
surviving long-term beside each other then one needs to construct institutions or rules that 
prevent the operation of the learning mechanisms in the model. There are various ways in 
which this could be done. One radical method is through a process of “ghettoisation” where a 
population with one set of values is isolated from another majority population by physical 
location or by a set of rules. In this case learning would only take place within the isolated 
population and so there would be no transmission of values from the majority population. 
Even if parts of the population are not ghettoised then institutions such as firms may be able 
to influence a person’s work values by partially isolating them from other influences. 
 Another possibility is that laws are passed and fines imposed that change the payoffs 
in the game. By changing the material payoffs one may hope to at least affect the utilities 
involved13. In doing so, one could change the utilities within each representation to such an 
extent that they change to a different category that enables them to coexist. A similar process 
could occur if laws are passed that increase psychic costs to such a level that representations 
similarly change. Alternatively, laws may block off certain representations being transmitted- 
an example would be the laws against racial hatred. 
 An important way in which values may be sustained is through education since this 
provides a “short-cut” in learning values. This may be used in sustaining a multicultural 
society by training part of the population in one set of values. An example of this may be the 
creation of religious schools where religious values are incorporated into the curriculum. 
Another example may be where the school curriculum aims to replace all values within a 
population wholesale with a fixed set of values. An example of this may be the inculcation of 
scientific values such as objectivity and accuracy in school, replacing more primitive 
superstitious ideas.  
13 However one should not believe that this is a simple matter. There have been increasing questions asked about 
the clash between intrinsic and extrinsic motivation. (c.f. Frey & Jegen 2001). There seems to be a tendency, for 
example, for intrinsic motivation to be wiped out by extrinsic incentives. This would mean that the use of fines 
may have perverse effects on behaviour. 
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 It follows that institutions and rules will form the values of the populations that are 
subject to them simply by intruding in the evolutionary process by which values come to be 
common within a population. Conversely, the dismantling of these rules and institutions 
could have a disruptive effect on the survival of certain values within a population. As we 
have seen, in the vast bulk of cases, there will be a tendency towards the assimilation of 
diverse values to one particular set. 
  The question of how norms can be transferred from one situation to another can also 
be solved by the current model. This can be done by realising that in novel situations one has 
to decide how to interpret the situation and the actions of others in that situation. This means 
(as was stated in section 9) that one needs to find a suitable representation. The best way is to 
find a similar situation in one’s past history and to use the representation for that situation. In 
other words, one needs to use a common psychological process, that of analogy, to find a 
good fit. The mystery of why one would, for example, leave a tip in a restaurant that one has 
no intention of visiting again becomes plain. One leaves a tip because one has made an 
analogy with a representation of other restaurant situations and this restaurant is a good “fit” 
with that representation. The representation’s attached utilities then act as reasons for leaving 
a tip14. 
 
 14. Conclusion 
It is argued in this paper that the current models of values in economics are 
insufficient to explain many of the stylised facts that exist about values and, as a result, 
cannot say much about the role of values in the economy and society. Part of the problem is 
that economists have ignored two ideas that have been widely used within the psychological 
and philosophical literature for a long period of time, namely the idea of a mental action and 
the idea of a representation.  
When we take account of these factors then we can build a simple model that is 
surprisingly productive in terms of predictions and can shed light on current debates in 
multiculturalism adding structure and objectivity to a debate that is often highly politicised. 
Furthermore, we can use the model to solve more abstract difficulties relating to the creation 
of social norms and the question of the transmission of norms. 
14 Note that this is different from the explanation offered by Sugden (2005). For Sugden the reason for giving a 
tip is the result of legitimate expectations, which have normative content- one thinks that the giving of a tip is 
ethically right and so one does it in all situations. Here, normativity and the transmission of normative behaviour 
are separate. The transmission is the result of analogies made with representations of previous similar situations 
while normativity is the result of valuation. 
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However, it should be noted that this model is still quite simple. A more realistic 
version would take account of the role of rules and institutions in value formation. 
Furthermore, the model is restricted to a two strategy base game. There is no reason in 
principle why the model should not be expanded outwards to include more physical strategies 
and more representations. However, this may mean that some of the more specific 
conclusions in the paper may have to be modified. 
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Appendix 1 
Demonstration of decomposition of differential equations: 
Strategies in the extensive form take the form: 
(X,t,v) 
Where X is the choice at node u0, t is the choice at nodes u1 or u3 and v is the choice 
at nodes u2 or u4. 
There are eight possible strategies that have eight probabilities qi (i=1..8). 
 R1UU R1UD R1DU R1DD R2UU R2UD R2DU R2DD 
R1UU a,a a,a b,c b,c a,w b,y a,w b,y 
R1UD a,a a,a b,c b,c c,x d,z c,x d,z 
R1DU c,b c,b d,d d,d a,w b,y a,w b,y 
R1DD c,b c,b d,d d,d c,x d,z c,x d,z 
R2UU w,a w,a x,c x,c w,w x,y w,w x,y 
R2UD w,a w,a x,c x,c y,x z,z y,x z,z 
R2DU y,b y,b z,d z,d w,w x,y w,w x,y 
R2DD y,b y,b z,d z,d y,x  z,z y,x z,z 
 
For ease of calculation assume that: 
Xij = �(qj×k × vj×k)4
k=1
 
For i=1…8 and j=1 or 2 where v is a payoff. 
This gives an abbreviated table: 
 R1UU R1UD R1DU R1DD R2UU R2UD R2DU R2DD 
R1 X11 X21 X31 X41 X51 X61 X71 X81 
R2 X12 X22 X32 X42 X52 X62 X72 X82 
 
We can also use the following abbreviations: 
X*11=X11=X21 X*12=X31=X41 
X*21=X12=X22 X*22=X32=X42 
X*31=X51=X71 X*32=X61=X81 
X*41=X52=X72 X*51=X62=X82 
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To analyse the truncated game: 
Assume that each payoff is stochastic in the sense that the population judgement of an 
individual payoff may vary. This variation is uniform across payoffs in the same 
representation but varies between the two representations. If k=1..4 and j=1..8 then 
 
When R1 is chosen by the population then the payoff change is ukjdt+σR1dW1 
When R2 is chosen by the population then the payoff change is ukjdt+σR2dW2 
 
Where u represents the non-stochastic component of the payoffs 
Each qi moves according to the replicator dynamic, so: 
 
𝑑𝑑𝑞𝑞1 = 𝑞𝑞1(�(𝑋𝑋11 + 𝑋𝑋12)𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 + 𝜎𝜎𝑅𝑅1𝑑𝑑𝑊𝑊1�
− �𝑞𝑞1�(𝑋𝑋11 + 𝑋𝑋12)𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 + 𝜎𝜎𝑅𝑅1𝑑𝑑𝑊𝑊1� + 𝑞𝑞2�(𝑋𝑋21 + 𝑋𝑋22)𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 + 𝜎𝜎𝑅𝑅1𝑑𝑑𝑊𝑊1�+ 𝑞𝑞3�(𝑋𝑋31 + 𝑋𝑋32)𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 + 𝜎𝜎𝑅𝑅1𝑑𝑑𝑊𝑊1� + 𝑞𝑞4�(𝑋𝑋41 + 𝑋𝑋42)𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 + 𝜎𝜎𝑅𝑅1𝑑𝑑𝑊𝑊1�+ 𝑞𝑞5�(𝑋𝑋51 + 𝑋𝑋52)𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 + 𝜎𝜎𝑅𝑅2𝑑𝑑𝑊𝑊2� + 𝑞𝑞6�(𝑋𝑋61 + 𝑋𝑋62)𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 + 𝜎𝜎𝑅𝑅2𝑑𝑑𝑊𝑊2�+ 𝑞𝑞7�(𝑋𝑋71 + 𝑋𝑋72)𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 + 𝜎𝜎𝑅𝑅2𝑑𝑑𝑊𝑊2� + 𝑞𝑞8�(𝑋𝑋81 + 𝑋𝑋82)𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 + 𝜎𝜎𝑅𝑅2𝑑𝑑𝑊𝑊2��) 
 
Similarly for other strategies 
If :  
𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅1 = 𝑞𝑞1 + 𝑞𝑞2 + 𝑞𝑞3 + 𝑞𝑞4 
 
 
Then: 
𝑑𝑑𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅1 = 𝑑𝑑𝑞𝑞1 + 𝑑𝑑𝑞𝑞2 + 𝑑𝑑𝑞𝑞3 + 𝑑𝑑𝑞𝑞4 
 
𝑑𝑑𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅1 = ��𝑞𝑞1(𝑋𝑋11 + 𝑋𝑋12) + 𝑞𝑞2(𝑋𝑋21 + 𝑋𝑋22) + 𝑞𝑞3(𝑋𝑋31 + 𝑋𝑋32) + 𝑞𝑞4(𝑋𝑋41 + 𝑋𝑋42)�𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑+  𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅1𝜎𝜎𝑅𝑅1𝑑𝑑𝑊𝑊1�
− 𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅1 ��𝑞𝑞1(𝑋𝑋11 + 𝑋𝑋12) + 𝑞𝑞2(𝑋𝑋21 + 𝑋𝑋22) + 𝑞𝑞3(𝑋𝑋31 + 𝑋𝑋32)+ 𝑞𝑞4(𝑋𝑋41 + 𝑋𝑋42)�𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 + 𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅1𝜎𝜎𝑅𝑅1𝑑𝑑𝑊𝑊1� + ((𝑞𝑞5(𝑋𝑋51 + 𝑋𝑋52) + 𝑞𝑞6(𝑋𝑋61 + 𝑋𝑋62)+ 𝑞𝑞7(𝑋𝑋71 + 𝑋𝑋72) + 𝑞𝑞8(𝑋𝑋81 + 𝑋𝑋82) + (1 − 𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅1)𝜎𝜎𝑅𝑅2𝑑𝑑𝑊𝑊2) 
Assuming that: 
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 𝑛𝑛�1 = (𝑞𝑞1 + 𝑞𝑞2)𝑋𝑋11∗ + (𝑞𝑞3 + 𝑞𝑞4)𝑋𝑋12∗(𝑞𝑞1 + 𝑞𝑞2 + 𝑞𝑞3 + 𝑞𝑞4)2  
 
𝑛𝑛�2 = (𝑞𝑞1 + 𝑞𝑞2)𝑋𝑋21∗ + (𝑞𝑞3 + 𝑞𝑞4)𝑋𝑋22∗(𝑞𝑞1 + 𝑞𝑞2 + 𝑞𝑞3 + 𝑞𝑞4)(𝑞𝑞5 + 𝑞𝑞6 + 𝑞𝑞7 + 𝑞𝑞8) 
 
𝑛𝑛�3 = (𝑞𝑞5 + 𝑞𝑞7)𝑋𝑋31∗ + (𝑞𝑞6 + 𝑞𝑞8)𝑋𝑋32∗(𝑞𝑞1 + 𝑞𝑞2 + 𝑞𝑞3 + 𝑞𝑞4)(𝑞𝑞5 + 𝑞𝑞6 + 𝑞𝑞7 + 𝑞𝑞8) 
 
𝑛𝑛�4 = (𝑞𝑞5 + 𝑞𝑞7)𝑋𝑋41∗ + (𝑞𝑞6 + 𝑞𝑞8)𝑋𝑋42∗(𝑞𝑞5 + 𝑞𝑞6 + 𝑞𝑞7 + 𝑞𝑞8)2  
 
These are the average payoffs if (R1, R1), (R1,R2),(R2,R1) and (R2,R2) are played 
respectively. If the subgames starting from u1, u2, u3 and u4 are in equilibrium then 
𝑛𝑛�1,𝑛𝑛�2,𝑛𝑛�3 𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑑𝑑 𝑛𝑛�4 are the equilibrium values for the respective subgames. 
 
Substituting: 
𝑑𝑑𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅1 = 𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅1�(𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅1𝑛𝑛�1 + (1 − 𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅1)𝑛𝑛�2)𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 + 𝜎𝜎𝑅𝑅1𝑑𝑑𝑊𝑊1�
− ((𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅1(𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅1𝑛𝑛�1 + (1 − 𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅1)𝑛𝑛�2)𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 + 𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅1𝜎𝜎𝑅𝑅1𝑑𝑑𝑊𝑊1)+ (1 − 𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅1)(𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅1𝑛𝑛�3 + (1 − 𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅1)𝑛𝑛�4)𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 + (1 − 𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅1)𝜎𝜎𝑅𝑅2𝑑𝑑𝑊𝑊2)) 
 = 𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅1(1 − 𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅1)�(𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅1𝑛𝑛�1 + (1 − 𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅1)𝑛𝑛�2) − (𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅1𝑛𝑛�3 + (1 − 𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅1)𝑛𝑛�4)�𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 + 𝜎𝜎𝑅𝑅1𝑑𝑑𝑊𝑊1 −
𝜎𝜎𝑅𝑅2𝑑𝑑𝑊𝑊2) 
 
Suppose : 
𝜎𝜎 = �(𝜎𝜎𝑅𝑅12 + 𝜎𝜎𝑅𝑅22 ) 
And:                      𝑊𝑊 = (𝜎𝜎𝑅𝑅1𝑊𝑊1−𝜎𝜎𝑅𝑅2𝑊𝑊2)
𝜎𝜎
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Therefore: 
 
𝑑𝑑𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅1 = 𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅1(1 − 𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅1)�(𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅1𝑛𝑛�1 + (1 − 𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅1)𝑛𝑛�2) − (𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅1𝑛𝑛�3 + (1 − 𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅1)𝑛𝑛�4)�𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 + 𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅1(1
− 𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅1)𝜎𝜎𝑑𝑑𝑊𝑊 
 
For individual subgames: 
 
Suppose v=1,2 
Payoffs from playing strategy ei and ej under representation Rv are: 
𝜋𝜋(𝑞𝑞\𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖) = (𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖1 + 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖2)𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 + 𝜎𝜎𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑑𝑑𝑊𝑊𝑅𝑅 
𝜋𝜋�𝑞𝑞\𝑒𝑒𝑗𝑗� = �𝑋𝑋𝑗𝑗1 + 𝑋𝑋𝑗𝑗2�𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 + 𝜎𝜎𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑑𝑑𝑊𝑊𝑅𝑅 
 
Suppose that v is fixed at v=v*. qiu is defined as the probability of taking physical 
action i within subgame u: 
𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖
𝑢𝑢 = ∑ 𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖2𝑖𝑖=1
∑ 𝑞𝑞𝑗𝑗
4
𝑗𝑗=1
 
Using differentials: 
 
𝑑𝑑𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖
𝑢𝑢 = ∑ 𝑑𝑑𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖2𝑖𝑖=1 ∑ 𝑞𝑞𝑗𝑗 − ∑ 𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖 ∑ 𝑑𝑑𝑞𝑞𝑗𝑗4𝑗𝑗=12𝑖𝑖=14𝑗𝑗=1
�∑ 𝑞𝑞𝑗𝑗
4
𝑗𝑗=1 �
2  
 
Supposing: 
                                                    𝑑𝑑𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖 = 𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖(𝜋𝜋(𝑞𝑞\𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖) − 𝜋𝜋(𝑞𝑞)) 
And: 
𝑑𝑑𝑞𝑞𝑗𝑗 = 𝑞𝑞𝑗𝑗(𝜋𝜋�𝑞𝑞\𝑒𝑒𝑗𝑗� − 𝜋𝜋(𝑞𝑞)) 
 
 
 
Gives: 
𝑑𝑑𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖
𝑢𝑢 = ∑ ∑ 𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖𝑞𝑞𝑗𝑗(𝜋𝜋(𝑞𝑞\𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖) − 𝜋𝜋�𝑞𝑞\𝑒𝑒𝑗𝑗�)4𝑗𝑗=12𝑖𝑖=1
�∑ 𝑞𝑞𝑗𝑗
4
𝑗𝑗=1 �
2  
 
Substituting: 
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𝑑𝑑𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖
𝑢𝑢 = ∑ ∑ 𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖𝑞𝑞𝑗𝑗(�(𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖1 + 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖2)𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 + 𝜎𝜎𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅∗𝑑𝑑𝑊𝑊𝑅𝑅∗� − ��𝑋𝑋𝑗𝑗1 + 𝑋𝑋𝑗𝑗2�𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 + 𝜎𝜎𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅∗𝑑𝑑𝑊𝑊𝑅𝑅∗�)4𝑗𝑗=12𝑖𝑖=1
�∑ 𝑞𝑞𝑗𝑗
4
𝑗𝑗=1 �
2  
 
Cancelling: 
𝑑𝑑𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖
𝑢𝑢 = ∑ ∑ 𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖𝑞𝑞𝑗𝑗((𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖1 + 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖2) − �𝑋𝑋𝑗𝑗1 + 𝑋𝑋𝑗𝑗2�)4𝑗𝑗=12𝑖𝑖=1
�∑ 𝑞𝑞𝑗𝑗
4
𝑗𝑗=1 �
2 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 
 
This can be reconfigured as a conventional differential equation: 
?̇?𝑞𝑖𝑖
𝑢𝑢 = ∑ ∑ 𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖𝑞𝑞𝑗𝑗((𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖1 + 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖2) − �𝑋𝑋𝑗𝑗1 + 𝑋𝑋𝑗𝑗2�)4𝑗𝑗=12𝑖𝑖=1
�∑ 𝑞𝑞𝑗𝑗
4
𝑗𝑗=1 �
2  
 
(The rest of the proof follows Cressman (2003 p. 185)) 
Looking at the numerator of the above equation, the expectations in the two payoff 
terms can be decomposed over endpoints mϵM with γ(.) being the probability of reaching a 
given endpoint. Hence the j payoff term can be decomposed into: 
� ��𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖𝑞𝑞𝑗𝑗𝛾𝛾(𝑚𝑚, 𝑞𝑞\𝑒𝑒𝑗𝑗)𝜋𝜋(𝑚𝑚)4
𝑗𝑗=1
2
𝑖𝑖=1𝑚𝑚∈𝑀𝑀
 
For m that do not follow u, write ej  as euj1\j2 where j1 refers to choices at those 
information sets of player 1 that are disjoint from u and j2 refers to others then, on the Wright 
manifold: 
 
��𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖𝑞𝑞𝑗𝑗𝛾𝛾(𝑚𝑚, 𝑞𝑞\𝑒𝑒𝑗𝑗)𝜋𝜋(𝑚𝑚)4
𝑗𝑗=1
2
𝑖𝑖=1
 
 
= � � � 𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖\𝑗𝑗2𝑢𝑢 𝑞𝑞𝑗𝑗1\1𝛾𝛾(𝑚𝑚, 𝑞𝑞\𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖\𝑗𝑗2𝑢𝑢 )𝜋𝜋(𝑚𝑚)2
𝑗𝑗2=1
2
𝑗𝑗1=1
2
𝑖𝑖=1
 
 
= ��𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖\𝑖𝑖𝑢𝑢 𝑞𝑞𝑗𝑗\𝑗𝑗𝑢𝑢 𝛾𝛾(𝑚𝑚, 𝑞𝑞\𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖\𝑖𝑖𝑢𝑢 )𝜋𝜋(𝑚𝑚)4
𝑗𝑗=1
2
𝑖𝑖=1
 
On pathways disjoint from u this means that the difference between payoff terms in 
the numerator of the difference equation becomes 0. The whole equation becomes: 
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 ?̇?𝑞𝑖𝑖
𝑢𝑢 = ∑ ∑ ∑ 𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖𝑞𝑞𝑗𝑗(𝛾𝛾�𝑚𝑚, 𝑞𝑞\𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖\𝑖𝑖𝑢𝑢 � − 𝛾𝛾�𝑚𝑚, 𝑞𝑞\𝑒𝑒𝑗𝑗\𝑗𝑗𝑢𝑢 �)𝜋𝜋(𝑚𝑚)𝑚𝑚 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 𝑢𝑢4𝑗𝑗=12𝑖𝑖=1
�∑ 𝑞𝑞𝑗𝑗
4
𝑗𝑗=1 �
2  
 = ∑ (∑ 𝑞𝑞𝑗𝑗 ∑ 𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖𝛾𝛾�𝑚𝑚, 𝑞𝑞\𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖\𝑖𝑖𝑢𝑢 � − ∑ 𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖 ∑ 𝑞𝑞𝑗𝑗𝛾𝛾�𝑚𝑚, 𝑞𝑞\𝑒𝑒𝑗𝑗\𝑗𝑗𝑢𝑢 �4𝑗𝑗=12𝑖𝑖=1 )𝜋𝜋(𝑚𝑚)2𝑖𝑖=14𝑗𝑗=1𝑚𝑚 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 𝑢𝑢
�∑ 𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖
4
𝑗𝑗=1 �
2  
 = ∑ 𝜋𝜋(𝑚𝑚)(𝑞𝑞1𝑢𝑢𝛾𝛾(𝑚𝑚, 𝑞𝑞\𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖) − 𝑞𝑞1𝑢𝑢 ∑ 𝑞𝑞𝑗𝑗𝛾𝛾�𝑚𝑚, 𝑞𝑞\𝑒𝑒𝑗𝑗�)4𝑗𝑗=1𝑚𝑚 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 𝑢𝑢
∑ 𝑞𝑞𝑗𝑗
4
𝑗𝑗=1
 
 = ∑ 𝑞𝑞1𝑢𝑢(𝛾𝛾(𝑚𝑚, 𝑞𝑞\𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖)𝜋𝜋(𝑚𝑚) − ∑ 𝑞𝑞𝑗𝑗𝛾𝛾�𝑚𝑚, 𝑞𝑞\𝑒𝑒𝑗𝑗�𝜋𝜋(𝑚𝑚))4𝑗𝑗=1𝑚𝑚 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 𝑢𝑢
∑ 𝑞𝑞𝑗𝑗
4
𝑗𝑗=1
 
 = 𝑞𝑞1𝑢𝑢(𝐾𝐾𝑢𝑢(𝑞𝑞\𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖)𝜋𝜋(𝑞𝑞𝑢𝑢\𝑒𝑒1𝑢𝑢) − 𝐾𝐾𝑢𝑢(𝑞𝑞\𝑒𝑒𝑗𝑗)𝜋𝜋(𝑞𝑞𝑢𝑢)) 
Where Ku is the probability that node u is reached. 
 = 𝐾𝐾𝑢𝑢(𝑞𝑞\𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖)𝑞𝑞1𝑢𝑢(𝜋𝜋𝑢𝑢(𝑞𝑞𝑢𝑢\𝑒𝑒1𝑢𝑢) − 𝜋𝜋𝑢𝑢(𝑞𝑞𝑢𝑢)) 
 
It follows that the game has one stochastic truncated game equation: 
 
𝑑𝑑𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅1 = 𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅1(1 − 𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅1)�(𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅1𝑛𝑛�1 + (1 − 𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅1)𝑛𝑛�2) − (𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅1𝑛𝑛�3 + (1 − 𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅1)𝑛𝑛�4)�𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 + 𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅1(1
− 𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅1)𝜎𝜎𝑑𝑑𝑊𝑊  
 
 
And four deterministic subgame equations: 
Subgame 1: 
 
?̇?𝑞𝑈𝑈
𝑢𝑢1 = 𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅1𝑢𝑢0𝑞𝑞𝑈𝑈𝑢𝑢1 �𝑞𝑞𝑈𝑈𝑢𝑢1𝑎𝑎 + �1 − 𝑞𝑞𝑈𝑈𝑢𝑢1�𝑏𝑏
− �𝑞𝑞𝑈𝑈
𝑢𝑢1�𝑞𝑞𝑈𝑈
𝑢𝑢1𝑎𝑎 + �1 − 𝑞𝑞𝑈𝑈𝑢𝑢1�𝑏𝑏� + (1 − 𝑞𝑞𝑈𝑈𝑢𝑢1)(𝑞𝑞𝑈𝑈𝑢𝑢1𝑐𝑐 + �1 − 𝑞𝑞𝑈𝑈𝑢𝑢1�𝑑𝑑�� 
 
Subgame 2: 
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?̇?𝑞𝑈𝑈
𝑢𝑢2 = (1 − 𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅1𝑢𝑢0)𝑞𝑞𝑈𝑈𝑢𝑢2 �𝑞𝑞𝑈𝑈𝑢𝑢3𝑎𝑎 + �1 − 𝑞𝑞𝑈𝑈𝑢𝑢3�𝑏𝑏
− �𝑞𝑞𝑈𝑈
𝑢𝑢2�𝑞𝑞𝑈𝑈
𝑢𝑢3𝑎𝑎 + �1 − 𝑞𝑞𝑈𝑈𝑢𝑢3�𝑏𝑏� + (1 − 𝑞𝑞𝑈𝑈𝑢𝑢2)(𝑞𝑞𝑈𝑈𝑢𝑢3𝑐𝑐 + �1 − 𝑞𝑞𝑈𝑈𝑢𝑢3�𝑑𝑑�� 
Subgame 3: 
 
?̇?𝑞𝑈𝑈
𝑢𝑢3 = 𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅1𝑢𝑢0𝑞𝑞𝑈𝑈𝑢𝑢3 �𝑞𝑞𝑈𝑈𝑢𝑢2𝑤𝑤 + �1 − 𝑞𝑞𝑈𝑈𝑢𝑢2�𝑥𝑥
− �𝑞𝑞𝑈𝑈
𝑢𝑢3�𝑞𝑞𝑈𝑈
𝑢𝑢2𝑤𝑤 + �1 − 𝑞𝑞𝑈𝑈𝑢𝑢2�𝑥𝑥� + (1 − 𝑞𝑞𝑈𝑈𝑢𝑢3)(𝑞𝑞𝑈𝑈𝑢𝑢2𝑦𝑦 + �1 − 𝑞𝑞𝑈𝑈𝑢𝑢2�𝑧𝑧�� 
 
Subgame 4: 
?̇?𝑞𝑈𝑈
𝑢𝑢4 = (1 − 𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅1𝑢𝑢0)𝑞𝑞𝑈𝑈𝑢𝑢4 �𝑞𝑞𝑈𝑈𝑢𝑢4𝑤𝑤 + �1 − 𝑞𝑞𝑈𝑈𝑢𝑢4�𝑥𝑥
− �𝑞𝑞𝑈𝑈
𝑢𝑢4�𝑞𝑞𝑈𝑈
𝑢𝑢4𝑤𝑤 + �1 − 𝑞𝑞𝑈𝑈𝑢𝑢4�𝑥𝑥� + (1 − 𝑞𝑞𝑈𝑈𝑢𝑢4)(𝑞𝑞𝑈𝑈𝑢𝑢4𝑦𝑦 + �1 − 𝑞𝑞𝑈𝑈𝑢𝑢4�𝑧𝑧�� 
 
 
 
Proof of Proposition 1: 
The proof of this proposition closely follows that of Fudenburg and Harris (1992) 
Sokhorod (1989) shows that: 
If I1=∞ and I2≠∞ then converges to R1 
If I1≠∞ and I2=∞ then converges to R2 
If I1≠∞ and I2≠∞ then converges to R1 with probability I1/(I1+I2) and R2 with 
probability I2/(I1+I2) 
If I1=∞ and I2≠∞ then system oscillates forever. This can be refined using M(PR1). If 
M(PR1) is finite then there is a unique ergodic distribution: 
 
𝑀𝑀(𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅1)
∫ 𝑀𝑀(𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅1)𝑑𝑑𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅110  
The distribution converges on this as t→∞. 
 
Substituting from the stochastic equation: 
 
𝐼𝐼1 = � 𝑒𝑒𝑥𝑥𝑝𝑝 �−� 2�(𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅1𝑛𝑛�1 + (1 − 𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅1)𝑛𝑛�2) − (𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅1𝑛𝑛�3 + (1 − 𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅1)𝑛𝑛�4)�𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅1(1 − 𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅1)𝜎𝜎2𝑞𝑞
𝛼𝛼
𝑑𝑑𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅1�
𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅1(0)
0
𝑑𝑑𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅1 
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𝐼𝐼2 = � 𝑒𝑒𝑥𝑥𝑝𝑝 �−� 2�(𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅1𝑛𝑛�1 + (1 − 𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅1)𝑛𝑛�2) − (𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅1𝑛𝑛�3 + (1 − 𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅1)𝑛𝑛�4)�𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅1(1 − 𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅1)𝜎𝜎2𝑞𝑞
𝛼𝛼
𝑑𝑑𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅1�
1
𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅1(0) 𝑑𝑑𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅1 
 
𝑀𝑀(𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅1) = 2𝜎𝜎2 𝑒𝑒𝑥𝑥𝑝𝑝 �� 2�(𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅1𝑛𝑛�1 + (1 − 𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅1)𝑛𝑛�2) − (𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅1𝑛𝑛�3 + (1 − 𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅1)𝑛𝑛�4)�𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅1(1 − 𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅1)𝜎𝜎2𝑞𝑞
𝛼𝛼
𝑑𝑑𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅1� 
 
The inner integrals for I1 and I2 are identical so they can be integrated and placed in 
the outer integral as follows: 
 
𝐼𝐼1 = � �𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅1𝛼𝛼 �2(𝑛𝑛�4−𝑛𝑛�2)𝜎𝜎2 �1 − 𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅11 − 𝛼𝛼 �2(𝑛𝑛�1−𝑛𝑛�3)𝜎𝜎2 𝑑𝑑𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅1𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅1(0)0  
 
𝐼𝐼2 = � �𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅1𝛼𝛼 �2(𝑛𝑛�4−𝑛𝑛�2)𝜎𝜎2 �1 − 𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅11 − 𝛼𝛼 �2(𝑛𝑛�1−𝑛𝑛�3)𝜎𝜎2 𝑑𝑑𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅11𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅1(0)  
 
Using similar reasoning M(PR1) can also be integrated: 
 
𝑀𝑀(𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅1) = 2𝜎𝜎2 ��𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅1𝛼𝛼 �2(𝑛𝑛�2−𝑛𝑛�4)𝜎𝜎2 �1 − 𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅11 − 𝛼𝛼 �2(𝑛𝑛�3−𝑛𝑛�1)𝜎𝜎2 � 
 
I1 is integrated between 0 and PR1(0) so, given the limits, it is an improper integral if 
the exponent on the (PR1/α) term is negative. It is divergent if the exponent is less than or 
equal to -1 and convergent otherwise. 
I2 is integrated between PR1(0) and 1 so a similar argument can be made with the ((1-
PR1)/(1-α)) term. 
A similar argument can be made for the integral: 
� 𝑀𝑀(𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅1)𝑑𝑑𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅11
0
 
Hence: I1 is finite iff : 
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2(𝑛𝑛�4 − 𝑛𝑛�2)
𝜎𝜎2
> −1 
 
Or:                                                       𝑛𝑛�2 − 𝑛𝑛�4 < 𝜎𝜎2 2�  
Likewise I2 is finite iff: 2(𝑛𝑛�1 − 𝑛𝑛�3)
𝜎𝜎2
> −1 
 
 
Or:                                                        𝑛𝑛�3 − 𝑛𝑛�1 < 𝜎𝜎2 2�  
 
The integral of M(PR1) is finite iff: 
                                             2(𝑛𝑛�2−𝑛𝑛�4)
𝜎𝜎2
> −1    and       2(𝑛𝑛�3−𝑛𝑛�1)
𝜎𝜎2
> −1 
 
Or:    𝑛𝑛�4 − 𝑛𝑛�2 < 𝜎𝜎2 2�    and   𝑛𝑛�1 − 𝑛𝑛�3 < 𝜎𝜎2 2�   
If  𝜑𝜑 = ∫ 𝑀𝑀(𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅1)𝑑𝑑𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅110  then: 
 
 
                 𝑀𝑀(𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅1)
∫ 𝑀𝑀(𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅1)𝑑𝑑𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅110 =  1𝜑𝜑 �𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅1𝛼𝛼 �2(𝑛𝑛�2−𝑛𝑛�4)𝜎𝜎2 �1−𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅11−𝛼𝛼 �2(𝑛𝑛�3−𝑛𝑛�1)𝜎𝜎2  
 
 
Proof of proposition 2: 
First note that the (1v4) and (4v1) cases are identical so we only need to prove one to 
prove the other. We will prove the (4v1) case. 
Assume subgame monotonicity and generic payoffs with (4v1) as the category 
combination. 
 For the symmetric subgame following u1, use equation (2*): 
?̇?𝑞𝑈𝑈
𝑢𝑢1 = 𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅1𝑞𝑞𝑈𝑈𝑢𝑢1(1 − 𝑞𝑞𝑈𝑈𝑢𝑢1)�𝑞𝑞𝑈𝑈𝑢𝑢1(𝑎𝑎 − 𝑐𝑐) + �1 − 𝑞𝑞𝑈𝑈𝑢𝑢1�(𝑏𝑏 − 𝑑𝑑)� 
 
 Assume that this is a category 4 game (i.e. a<c and b<d) so it must be the case 
that 𝑞𝑞𝑈𝑈𝑢𝑢1 → 0 as t→∞.  
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For the symmetric subgame following u4, use equation (5*) 
?̇?𝑞𝑈𝑈
𝑢𝑢4 = (1 − 𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅1)𝑞𝑞𝑈𝑈𝑢𝑢4(1 − 𝑞𝑞𝑈𝑈𝑢𝑢4)�𝑞𝑞𝑈𝑈𝑢𝑢4(𝑤𝑤 − 𝑦𝑦) + �1 − 𝑞𝑞𝑈𝑈𝑢𝑢4�(𝑥𝑥 − 𝑧𝑧)� 
 
 Assume that this is a category 1 game (i.e. w>y and x>z) so it must be the case 
that 𝑞𝑞𝑈𝑈𝑢𝑢4 → 1 as t→∞    
For the linked asymmetric subgame, assuming the same payoffs and use equations 
(3*) and (4*) 
?̇?𝑞𝑈𝑈
𝑢𝑢2 = (1 − 𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅1)𝑞𝑞𝑈𝑈𝑢𝑢2(1 − 𝑞𝑞𝑈𝑈𝑢𝑢2)�𝑞𝑞𝑈𝑈𝑢𝑢3(𝑎𝑎 − 𝑐𝑐) + �1 − 𝑞𝑞𝑈𝑈𝑢𝑢3�(𝑏𝑏 − 𝑑𝑑)� 
?̇?𝑞𝑈𝑈
𝑢𝑢3 = 𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅1𝑞𝑞𝑈𝑈𝑢𝑢3(1 − 𝑞𝑞𝑈𝑈𝑢𝑢3)�𝑞𝑞𝑈𝑈𝑢𝑢2(𝑤𝑤 − 𝑦𝑦) + �1 − 𝑞𝑞𝑈𝑈𝑢𝑢2�(𝑥𝑥 − 𝑧𝑧)� 
This results in 𝑞𝑞𝑈𝑈
𝑢𝑢2 → 0 as t→∞ and 𝑞𝑞𝑈𝑈𝑢𝑢3 → 1 as t→∞. This results in the following 
truncated game payoff matrix only showing deterministic payoffs: 
 R1 R2 
R1 d,d c,x 
R2 x,c w,w 
 
Assume that the population has a stochastic equilibrium with stable probability 
distribution 𝑀𝑀(𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅1)
∫ 𝑀𝑀(𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅1)𝑑𝑑𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅110  as defined by Proposition 1. This means that d-x< σ2/2 and w-
c<σ2/2. By inspection of the payoff matrix, one can see that those members of the population 
that select Representation 1 will also only play D (since d and c only ever appear as utility 
outcomes of playing D) while those members of the population that select Representation 2 
will also only play U (since x and w only ever appear as utility outcomes of playing U). 
Now assume that we have only one strategy played in one representation and the other 
strategy only played in the second representation. We also assume that we have a mixed 
equilibrium in the truncated game with a probability distribution 𝑀𝑀(𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅1)
∫ 𝑀𝑀(𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅1)𝑑𝑑𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅110 . 
None of the outcomes in the truncated game can be category 3 because the 
proposition excludes mixed action solutions by assumption. (2v3) is excluded anyway by 
assumption. 
In each symmetric subgame there are a maximum of only two pure strategies 
equilibria that the population can converge on. This means there are two possible cases in a 
given symmetric subgame where the population converges to an equilibrium. 
The symmetric subgame following u1 is reached by playing R1 while the symmetric 
subgame following u4 is reached by playing R2. Suppose that in the symmetric subgame 
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following u1, 𝑞𝑞𝑈𝑈
𝑢𝑢1 → 0 as t→∞. It follows that in the symmetric subgame following u4, 𝑞𝑞𝑈𝑈𝑢𝑢4 →1 as t→∞ because everyone choosing R2 must choose the opposite strategy by assumption. 
For there to be just one strategy played in one representation then for role 1 (playing R1) in 
the linked asymmetric subgame  𝑞𝑞𝑈𝑈
𝑢𝑢2 → 0 as t→∞ as this is consistent in physical strategy 
with the subgame following u1.  For role 2 (playing R2) 𝑞𝑞𝑈𝑈
𝑢𝑢3 → 1 as t→∞ as this is consistent 
in physical strategy with the subgame following u4. Excluding category 3, this pattern of 
preferences can only occur with the category combination (4v1).  
A similar argument establishes (1v4).■ 
 
Proof of proposition 3: 
Proof by contradiction. 
By proposition 1 if the population has 𝑀𝑀(𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅1)
∫ 𝑀𝑀(𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅1)𝑑𝑑𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅110  as an equilibrium stochastic 
equilibrium then we are in a mixed strategy case for representations. 
Assume that such an equilibrium exists. Also assume that we have generic payoffs. 
Fix an arbitrary strategy (since it is a symmetric game, we will choose U). 
In the symmetric subgames: since category 3 is excluded and since we have assumed 
pure strategies so 𝑞𝑞𝑈𝑈
𝑢𝑢1 → 1 and 𝑞𝑞𝑈𝑈𝑢𝑢4 → 1  as t→∞. 
Assuming one has the same payoffs in the linked asymmetric subgame then   𝑞𝑞𝑈𝑈
𝑢𝑢2 → 1 
and 𝑞𝑞𝑈𝑈
𝑢𝑢3 → 1  as t→∞. 
This means that the truncated game matrix, with deterministic payoffs only, is as 
follows: 
 
 R1 R2 
R1 a,a a,w 
R2 w,a w,w 
 
Given generic payoffs, there can only be two possible preference orderings: a-w> σ2/2 
or a-w< σ2/2. In the first case 𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅1 → 1 as t→∞ with probability 1 while in the second case 
𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅1 → 0 as t→∞ with probability 1.  This contradicts the assumption of an equilibrium 
stochastic equilibrium with distribution 𝑀𝑀(𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅1)
∫ 𝑀𝑀(𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅1)𝑑𝑑𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅110 . A similar argument can be made for 
setting a physical strategy of D.  Hence the proposition is true. ■ 
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Proof of proposition 4: 
Firstly note that it is not possible to have a situation where there are any mixed 
strategies in the asymmetric subgames because (2v3) and (3v2) are excluded by assumption.  
Given this, there is only one way in which the proposition can hold i.e. if the 
symmetric subgames have mixed strategies equilibria. This means that  𝑞𝑞𝑈𝑈
𝑢𝑢1 →
𝑑𝑑−𝑏𝑏
𝑑𝑑−𝑏𝑏+𝑎𝑎−𝑐𝑐
  and 
 𝑞𝑞𝑈𝑈
𝑢𝑢4 →
𝑧𝑧−𝑥𝑥
𝑧𝑧−𝑥𝑥+𝑓𝑓−𝑦𝑦
 as t→∞. These ratios must both be positive and less than 1 so either 
the numerator and denominator are positive or they are both negative. To be less than 1, the 
differences (z-x), (w-y), (d-b) and (a-c) must either be all positive or all negative. This 
suggests that they can only exist as equilibria under categories 2 or 3. 
Examining equations 2* and 5*: 
?̇?𝑞𝑈𝑈
𝑢𝑢1 = 𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅1𝑞𝑞𝑈𝑈𝑢𝑢1(1 − 𝑞𝑞𝑈𝑈𝑢𝑢1)�𝑞𝑞𝑈𝑈𝑢𝑢1(𝑎𝑎 − 𝑐𝑐) + �1 − 𝑞𝑞𝑈𝑈𝑢𝑢1�(𝑏𝑏 − 𝑑𝑑)� 
?̇?𝑞𝑈𝑈
𝑢𝑢4 = (1 − 𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅1)𝑞𝑞𝑈𝑈𝑢𝑢4(1 − 𝑞𝑞𝑈𝑈𝑢𝑢4)�𝑞𝑞𝑈𝑈𝑢𝑢4(𝑤𝑤 − 𝑦𝑦) + �1 − 𝑞𝑞𝑈𝑈𝑢𝑢4�(𝑥𝑥 − 𝑧𝑧)� 
 
It can be seen that they only both converge on their interior equilibria if a<c, b>d,w<y 
and x>z. If this is the case then the category combination must be (3v3)■ 
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